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Executive Summary  
Work undertaken by Northumbria University forms a key component of The Prüm 
Implementation, Evaluation and Strengthening (P.I.E.S.) of Forensic DNA Data Exchange E.C. 
funded research programme led by the Nationaal Instituut voor Criminalistiek en 
Criminologie / Institut National de Criminalistique et de Criminologie (NICC/INCC), Belgium 
since November 2012. 
Overall the project sought and has provided knowledge and development of the Prüm 
directive through a number of integrated strands of enquiry of which the Northumbria 
University strand reported here is but one. Collectively the project has considered a myriad 
of important issues such as criminal justice context, development of Member State 
operational provision, evaluation, scope, policy development and more. Work undertaken 
at Northumbria University has sought to provide useful and relevant context provision to aid 
understanding of crime across EU member states and specifically the issue of offending by 
intra-EU migrants and the potential for the development of crime prevention initiatives 
and/or policy development. 
Activity has been conducted across the 3 years of the project life in 3 high level stages: 
 Significant literature review process seeking to acknowledge and understand the 
contemporary knowledge base surrounding cross border/transnational crime and 
identify significant knowledge gaps 
 Development of a transferable analytical model utilising English criminal justice data 
to provide knowledge on intra-EU offending and seek to fill knowledge gaps 
identified through the literature review process 
 Exploration of intra-EU migrant offending across Member States and exploration of 
the transferability of the analytical model 
Each stage has been completed and is reported upon within this final report and 
summarised key findings emanating from the research follow. 
 
Key findings 
The Prüm directive stipulates that Information is to be exchanged between authorities 
"responsible for the prevention and investigation of criminal offences", for the purpose of 
‘crime prevention’ and ‘investigation’. There is no requirement for this activity to be linked 
to organised or serious crime but an implied requirement or assumption that one state will 
seek information from another on the basis that there has been some form of cross border 
activity in relation to the criminal matter being investigated. Cross border or Transnational 
offending has received some (limited) exploration in the academic literature and linked with 
consideration by such agencies as the United Nations but the Prüm directive alters the 
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concept previously derived. Generally interlinked with organised crime (a contentious term 
in itself) Transnational/Cross border crime  has been seen as an act punishable by law in 
each of the information exchanging states, and involving the movement of people, objects 
or decisions across borders with an inherent assumption that movement across borders is 
required to commit or at least commission the offence. Within Prüm the ‘transnational’ 
nature of the offending may now solely be the movement of the offender across state 
boundaries without any reference to or intent to offend in that journey. No longer is the 
cross border movement of people in order to offend the required focus, instead the focus 
widens to encapsulate movement of people across state boundaries who may subsequently, 
irrespective of drivers for movement, commit crime. As such a far more localised concept of 
cross border crime is developed, that being the localised offending of an individual who has 
origins in another member state. The potential therefore exists for the Prüm directive to 
impact on localised crime through detection of offences and informed direction of messages 
to potential offenders of the existence and operation of the Prüm directive within localities 
to promote deterrence.  
It is suggested that emphasis on this localised aspect should be further developed through 
substantial spatial analysis of offending and identification of relevant ‘localised’ areas to 
inform and develop pro-active use of the Prüm directive outcomes. 
Research presented here includes a significant literature searching and review exercise of 
which this report provides succinct coverage. Academic literature on migrant crime was 
found to be very limited, contemporary criminological and geography discipline studies 
tending to focus more on organised crime involving cross border offending activity with 
limited outputs on offending by non-nationals within an EU Member State. A 
comprehensive and broad literature search has revealed less than 15 academically 
published studies with a tentative EU migration and crime emphasis. This lack of established 
material identified substantial knowledge gaps in terms of the offending by intra-EU 
migrants within member states and the potential diversity of spatial offending contexts and 
attributes of offending groups within intra-EU migrant nationalities.  
Poor understanding of such context impacts on the ability to provide suitably informed 
strategies of resourcing criminal justice assets and developing informed crime prevention 
policies.  
Consequently knowledge gaps provided the required drivers to the project of developing a 
clear understanding of the spatial and human/criminal career attributes of intra-EU migrant 
offenders. The project objectives sought to develop an analytical model of intra-EU migrant 
offending transferable across project partner member states to identify the nature and 
diversity of such offending. Whilst not a signatory to Prüm the UK presented the 
opportunity to develop a suitable ‘pilot’ analytical model given the knowledge contained 
within the research team concerning the type, volume and accessibility of suitably geo-
[Page 5 of 103] 
  
referenced criminal justice and crime/offending data held by public authorities. Research 
work therefore followed two distinct avenues namely: 
o Development of a transferable, robust and intuitive analytical model of intra-
EU migrant offending within England between 2011 and 2013, and 
o Exploration of data existence and public availability within project partner 
member states (and wider) to accommodate the transferability of a UK based 
analytical model 
Spatial examination of intra-EU offending across a 3 year time span utilising differing spatial 
analytical methods provides useful and relevant information on the spatial diversity (or non-
diversity) of these offending groups. Of the spatial analysis methods explored it was the 
opinion of the research team that the use of Standardised Location Quotients (SLQs), Gini 
coefficients and Lorenz curves provides an intuitive and visual model of spatial diversity 
displayed by intra-EU migrant offenders which is readily accessible to practitioners and 
researchers alike. SLQs also provide flexibility in the subjective decision making of 
denominator which was found useful following analysis which had established the very poor 
integrity of population data by nationality, so limiting the creation of offending as a rate of 
population.  
Spatial aspects of offending significantly differ between nationalities; they should not be 
spatially generalised, highlighting that the exploration of intra-EU migrant crime (and 
potentially the investigation and justice resource provision within country) by nationality 
requires spatial context knowledge to generate informed understanding. 
Analysis of further data regarding the age and gender of offenders, together with 
examination of the types of crime committed by intra-EU migrants equally identifies that 
such factors are diverse across nationalities with statistically significant differences 
apparent.  
Knowledge of the age/crime profiles of such nationality sub sets and the types of crime 
committed is essential in order to inform resource prioritisation and accurately direct 
crime prevention messages. 
These three key messages of understanding spatial context, age profiles and crime types 
clearly link with the localised element of ‘cross border’ crime discussed at the beginning of 
this section. Crime prevention is a core but often ‘hidden’ function of all criminal justice 
work relying on the dissemination of messages in the correct format to impact the correct 
population sub set. Unless that sub set is accurately defined and understood risk exists to 
the informed dissemination process, limiting message impact. The Prüm directive and its 
operation has the potential to impact on the offending decision and that decision will take 
place irrespective of the crime to be committed – there is no need for crime prevention 
messages re the Prüm  directive to target serious crime only.  
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It remains imperative that crime prevention message direction is based upon firm 
knowledge and understanding of the socio/crime profile of the population sub set but that 
knowledge base currently requires development. 
Data was collected on population, nationality of foreigners in the population, counts of 
crime, counts of foreign offenders charged, and where possible the nationality of the 
foreign offenders charged. Crime data is not as easily accessible for many EU member states 
as it is within the UK (19 out of 28 member states could not provide data relating to foreign 
and native offender at a geographic scale lower than country level). 
Analysis of the data pertaining to the calendar year 2012 identified limited availability of 
data cross the EU member states relating to offending by foreign nationals at a number of 
different geographic scales. Appendix 4 provides a detailed breakdown of the data 
availability for each EU member state providing geographic as well as demographic detail.  
Overall, data availability (generally crime and nationality populations) from EU15 member 
states was considered to be relatively poor.  
Foreign offending by EU nationals is not high in volume in the EU member states analysed; it 
makes up approximately 4% of total crime in the Czech Republic, approximately 3% of total 
crime in Italy, Germany and Denmark, 2.5% in the Netherlands, 1.5% in Slovakia, and less 
than 1% in England, Austria and Poland. The figures illustrate that the highest foreign 
offending according to EU nationality varied greatly between these nine countries.  
Overall this research has found very limited availability of data within which migration 
and crime can be explored, utilising publicly available data.  
Although it was possible to obtain information and data relating to population and crime for 
each country at a number of geographic scales, and some were able to provide data on 
foreign and native offenders/population at scales lower than country level, very limited data 
was available beyond that. It has become apparent that the public availability of data 
relating to nationality (or country of origin) of offenders is extremely limited. It is unclear 
what the underlying reasons behind this are; although we do not feel it is unreasonable to 
consider that they may be politically driven in nature.  
Informed cross-border information exchange between member states is difficult to achieve 
if information is not collected and made available. We have shown the benefits of analysing 
data relating to localised offending by foreign nationals in England, and have highlighted 
some of the problems of utilising openly available data across EU member states. 
In order to inform intelligence by national and international police agencies, collective 
understanding at the EU level is required, rather than simply continuing to focus on 
developing a national understanding for each EU member state individually in isolation. 
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Considering the implementation of EU policies enabling the exchange of bio-information, we 
have tried to provide a more generalised and contextual EU wide picture of intra-EU migrant 
crime than has previously been carried out. Data on localised offending by foreign nationals 
can be used to inform intelligence by national and international police agencies, to generate 
effective cross-border information exchange. However, where such information is not 
collected and available for analysis within member states, informed knowledge between 
member states is difficult to achieve. Data is needed upon which requirements for inter-
state communication can be built upon for positive investigatory, community safety and 
crime prevention benefits. 
Within this report we identify a number of factors for consideration in relation to Prüm: 
1) The broad definition of ‘crime’ which is stated in the EU initiative has the potential to 
be interpreted to mean ‘all’ crime, although “MS may decide to give priority to 
combating serious crime bearing in mind the limited technical capacities available for 
transmitting data”. We propose that definition of all crime needs to be 
reconsidered, to specify more clearly types of crimes which ‘should’ be included in 
the treaty. Consideration needs to be given towards those crimes which have a 
greater potential to deposit forensic trace material.  
2) The data obtained from English police forces has identified positive spatial 
correlation of intra-EU migrant criminal activity maintained over time, indicating 
potentially independent geographies of crime. It has not been possible to transfer 
the model developed in England to any other EU member state, at the same 
geographic level. Generally, openly available data is of poor quality and very limited 
in scope for all EU member states. Data limitations do not allow for the provision of 
an accurate cross EU picture of the socio-economic and criminogenic factors which 
affect intra-EU migration, nor does it identify regions which may benefit from a 
greater Prüm data sharing focus or development of targeted crime prevention 
messages. 
3) Some spatial  analysis was carried out across the EU which identified border regions 
as zones of greater activity for foreign offending, however this data was limited to 
the categorisations of ‘foreign’ or ‘native’ and did not provide a breakdown of 
nationality. Consequently it was not possible to determine whether it was EU or non 
EU-nationals who were offending in border regions. However, this increased border 
activity does relate to work carried out by other project partners (Bernasco et al.) 
who utilised the Prüm Treaty to develop a cartography of DNA hits between the 
Netherlands and the EU, establishing transnational spatial patterns of offending 
predominantly indicating high rates of activities in border regions. This may provide 
important intelligence for regional police forces to focus resources on the collection 
of body fluids at crime scenes to improve potential Prüm hits.  
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4) Data from England identified five nationalities of specific interest – Poland, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Portugal and Romania – using a number of statistical techniques. Italy and 
Eire were also found to significant for 2011 and 2012-2013 respectively, but were 
not consistently significant across all three years (the other five were). The 
identification of these outlier nationalities in England, provided areas of further 
analysis which has the potential to impact police policy, crime prevention and 
intelligence strategies. Again, the prevalence and importance of these nationalities 
could not be repeated at EU level and is not available to inform EU policy and 
policing. However, it is anticipated that similar geographic and nationality disparity 
would be evidence in other EU member states.  
5) Further analysis of English data also considered age, gender and crime types 
committed by foreign nationals, and it quickly became evident that differences exist. 
Of particular importance to Prüm is the difference in crime types committed by EU 
nationals: A8 and A2 nationals predominantly commit acquisitive offences (e.g. 
theft) and very little violent offences. The likelihood of obtaining forensic trace 
material (particularly DNA) from acquisitive crimes is low. Consequently, Prüm may 
not be the most effective means of identifying intra-EU offenders originating from 
A8 or A2 member states.  
6) Overall, there is significant data uncertainty when trying to paint a macro cross-
member state picture of the intra-EU migration and crime issue, providing limited 
knowledge generation opportunities without multi-disciplinary cooperation on an 
international level. The cross-boundary sharing of information ought to be based on 
robust, accurate and detailed data, which is currently unavailable for a number of 
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Introduction 
The core of the P.I.E.S. project lies in the development of the operational status of directives 
laid down in the EU through the Prüm decision, namely the safe and timely exchange of bio-
informatic data between states. Alongside the tasks of partners in this operational 
development Northumbria University has sought to provide context to the operational 
aspects through examination of the criminogenic background and the Prüm decision in 
terms of its relationship with harmful activity. Cross border crime is the driver for the 
original convention of 2005 and as the Council of the EU deals with and in a legalistic 
framework, the term 'crime' is quite clearly reflective of an activity that is unlawful by 
means of legislation, and would seem to follow the expected typical dictionary definition. 
Cross border crime would therefore appear to relate to criminal acts which in some way 
straddle state borders, however there is no section within the 2005 Convention or the 
subsequently adopted Act of 2008 and Technical Provisions that deals with the definition of 
these terms. 
It becomes necessary to consider the term cross-border in some further detail, if for no 
other reason than to inform the research activity to be undertaken and set suitable 
parameters within which the research can be contained and directed. Contemporary 
criminology and associated literature pays little attention to formally defining terms of 
'transnational' or 'cross-border'. Almost all research dealing with any level of the 
globalisation of crime is firmly focused on the concept of organised crime in its many 
suggested forms. 
This report will begin with a provision of the definitions of the terms ‘transnational crime’ 
and ‘organised crime’ before setting out Northumbria Universities’ aims and objectives.  
 
Defining transnational crime 
The United Nations adopted the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2003) 
to "promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime more 
effectively" (Article 1). Whilst again being primarily focused on organised crime, for which 
the convention lays down formal definitions, the concept of transnational crime is examined 
and defined as: 
An offence is transnational in nature if: 
(a) It is committed in more than one State; 
(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, 
direction or control takes place in another State; 
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(c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in 
criminal activities in more than one State; or 
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State (Article 3). 
The Convention also defines 'serious' crime in section (b) of Article 2, as it considers the 
undertaking of serious crime to be a constituent part of the act of an organised crime group 
within the meaning of the convention. In this case serious crime is defined as: 
(b) ‘Serious crime’ shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a 
maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty. 
A definition that may become relevant with the Prüm Convention aligning the commission 
of serious crime with certain criminal justice resource provision. 
Within the Prüm Convention information is to be exchanged between authorities which are 
"responsible for the prevention and investigation of criminal offences" (Article 1), with no 
formal definition of why those authorities should exchange information other than for the 
purpose of ‘crime prevention’ and ‘investigation’. There is therefore no requirement for this 
activity to be linked to organised crime (however one may define that concept) but an 
implied requirement or assumption that one state will seek information from another on 
the basis that there has been some form of cross border activity in relation to the criminal 
matter being investigated. 
Albanese (2012) has proposed a classification of transnational crimes, consisting of three 
types of crime: provision of illicit goods, provision of illicit services and infiltration of 
business or government [1]. Further to this classification, he contends that by nature, most 
of these crimes require more than one person to be involved, therefore all transnational 
crime can be seen as a form of organised crime. 
Coupled with the typical definition of crime as ‘an act punishable by law’ we can consider 
transnational crime for the purposes of this project as requiring: 
(a) an act punishable by law in each of the information exchanging states, and 
(b) involving the movement of people, objects or decisions across borders 
The existing literature on transnational crime focuses heavily on organised crime [2], and 
drug and human trafficking in particular [3]. Also involving cross-border movement, and 
suggested to have increased since EU enlargement, is organised acquisitive crime with 
vehicles stolen for shipment overseas a continuing problem for the UK. Despite the focus on 
organised crime, it has been reported that the nature of offending by foreign nationals is 
mainly low level such as minor disorder and shoplifting [4]. The rate of involvement in 
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serious crime by foreign nationals was similar to that of UK nationals, although some 
involvement in transnational organised crime is also apparent.  
There has been much focus on the lack of a single agreed definition of ‘organised crime’ [5-
7]. It has been described as a ‘contested concept’ [6] and an ambiguous term [8]. 
‘Transnational Organised Crime’ (TOC) is therefore also ambiguous [3], and has been 
criticised by scholars, who highlight in particular the error of welding two undefined terms 
together. It is unclear from the literature whether the use of the term refers to crossing of 
borders by criminals, criminal activities, networks, organisations or power [3]. 
Criminological literature and Governmental publications have attempted to identify 
structural characteristics thought to be important in organised crime [6].  
“‘Organized crime’ is understood to be the large-scale and complex criminal 
activity carried on by groups of persons, however loosely or tightly organized, for 
the enrichment of those participating and at the expense of the community and its 
members. It is frequently accomplished through ruthless disregard of any law, 
including offences against the person, and frequently in connexion with political 
corruption” [9]. 
Madsen (2009) considers the ‘most authoritative definition’ of organised crime to be that of 
the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) which 
defines it as a: “structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and 
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences in order 
to obtain, directly or indirectly, financial or other material benefit”. However, this definition 
too has been subject to criticism, and deemed ‘too broad’ [10]. 
TOC can be the result of offenders operating internationally, in pursuit of the most 
rewarding targets and markets. Or it could be locally operating offenders cooperating with 
others, where it is the networking that crosses borders rather than the offenders [11]. 
This problem of defining organized crime is unlikely to be resolved, since it is an entity that 
is diffuse and changing [5]. The United Nations declare they have deliberately not published 
a concise definition of transnational organised crime in recognition that new types of crime 
emerge constantly as conditions change over time [12]. 
The problem of organised crime has risen on the agenda of the EU and its member states 
and increasingly been seen as a serious threat [2, 8, 10, 13]. It is acknowledged that there is 
a lack of data and literature available regarding the nature and extent of organised crime 
[8], and that attempts to model or estimate the situation would be flawed due to the 
shortage of comparable data. The existence of transnational organised crime at all has been 
questioned [14]. The prominence of organised crime when discussing transnational crime 
has been criticised, with arguments that the impacts of organised crime are experienced 
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locally, within territories, not transnationally [13]. Hobbs (1998) has questioned whether 
organised crime is as great a threat as some organisations portray it to be [14]. 
The EU’s Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) gives the crime types 
seen as a problem Europe-wide: drugs, illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings, 
fraud, cigarette smuggling, counterfeiting, weapons trafficking, organised property crime, 
environmental crime, money laundering, and cybercrime [15]. The focus of the literature 
varies, with some placing emphasis on the criminal activity, some on the ‘organised’ nature 
of it, and some on the networks or organisations. 
Von Lampe (2009) proposed five types of criminal organisation [11, 16]. Of particular 
relevance is the type of organisation he calls “networks with no social support structure”; 
referring to foreign-based criminal groups without a support structure within the country 
they are offending in. He suggests that this type of group enter countries to engage in 
“crime tourism” [5].  
The Europol Drug Markets Analysis [17] reported that the main trafficking route for heroin 
into the EU is the ‘Balkan route’, from Afghanistan, through Iran and Turkey, into Eastern 
European countries such as Albania, Romania and Bulgaria. From these Balkan countries the 
heroin is transported onto Western and Northern Europe, with the Netherlands and 
Belgium in particular acting as distribution centres for heroin to the rest of Western Europe. 
The report highlights the important route of cocaine, from South America into the EU via 
Spain and Portugal, from where it is distributed to Western Europe, with France having high 
transit of cocaine [17]. The report also draws attention to a recent trend of cocaine arriving 
in Europe at Black Sea ports in Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Ukraine, with Albania used as 
a storage country, and the emergence of Baltic Sea countries in cocaine trafficking. Analysis 
of cocaine price data in has provided evidence of the flow of cocaine; showing that from 
arrival in Spain and Portugal, it tends to move eastwards through Europe, with the cost 
increasing as it moves further from the source [18]. 
It was noted in the Europol report, that herbal cannabis is increasingly being grown in 
countries throughout the EU for domestic use, while the production of cannabis resin 
continues to be mainly in Morocco then smuggled into Europe through Spain and Portugal. 
Dutch criminal groups are believed to play an important role in the production of cannabis, 
following increased law enforcement in the Netherlands they are increasingly operating also 
in Germany, Belgium and other West European countries. The Netherlands and Belgium are 
described as important distribution centres for heroin, cocaine and cannabis. The 
Netherlands is also reported to be the main productions centre for synthetic drugs for 
European distribution [8, 17]. There is thought to be a ‘growing trend for producing close to 
destination’ [17]. 
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Literature on drug trafficking has suggested that criminal groups who traffic drugs may also 
traffic arms [19] or humans [20]. It is thought that the infrastructure for trafficking is similar 
or shared. It is also proposed that drug markets are saturated, leading criminal groups to 
diversify [20].  
The trafficking of humans is the third largest illegal trade globally [21], and has recently 
attracted increasing political concern [22]. However, there has been ambiguity between 
human smuggling and human trafficking, and also illegal immigration, with the terms being 
used interchangeably in some cases, although they are different, albeit linked, issues. 
The UN protocol to prevent trafficking [23] defines trafficking as “the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons”, using force, threat, coercion, 
abduction, deception or abuse of power, “for the purpose of exploitation”. This definition 
allows for any of the actions along the chain to be classed as trafficking [24]. However the 
definition has been criticised for focusing on the movement of victims and not on the 
exploitation that follows, leading to law enforcement therefore tending to focus on 
disrupting the movement rather than the exploitation or enforced labour practices in 
destination countries. Smuggling is defined as the “illegal movement of persons across 
borders in order to obtain some form of benefit”, with the migrants’ consent implied [22]. 
Migrants choosing to be smuggled may be driven to it by conditions such as war and 
poverty. 
Data relating to human trafficking is difficult to obtain due its hidden nature, therefore 
estimates of the extent are vague [24].Those who commit human trafficking are considered 
to be professional and organised criminals, who adapt their operations according to the 
existing markets [22]. However it has been suggested that there is a lack of evidence to 
support conceptualising this trafficking in an organised crime context [22]. 
Organised crime groups may be small and involved in one stage of the trafficking process, or 
more powerful and in control of the whole process, with cells operating in more than one 
country [15]. There is an increasing tendency for organised crime groups to cooperate with 
groups of different nationalities, in the process of human trafficking [15]. 
It has been suggested that it is not only criminal organisations involved but that overtly 
legitimate agencies may be involved, either knowingly or unknowingly, for example 
providing tourist visas for the entry of victims, arranging transport, or arranging 
employment [25]. While 71% of victims are trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation 
[12], there is also a demand for forced labour in the fields of construction, agriculture, 
service, manufacturing and domestic work [15]. 
The Prüm Decision and subsequently developed processes set a secondary use of the terms 
discussed. A DNA crime scene profile from one member state may be (and often is) used to 
identify a single person for a serious criminal act by comparison with a database held in 
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another member state. As a result the ‘transnational’ nature of the offending in question 
may solely be the movement of the offender across state boundaries without any reference 
to or intent to offend in that journey. No longer is the cross border movement of people 
(individuals or otherwise) in order to offend the required focus, instead the focus widens to 
encapsulate movement of people across state boundaries who may subsequently, 
irrespective of drivers for movement, commit crime. 
 
Strategic contextual content  
The Prüm Decision provides for the automated exchange of DNA, fingerprints and vehicle 
registration data, as well as for other forms of police cooperation between all the member 
states aligned to the decision (does not include the U.K. at this time). Major technical, 
procedural legal and strategic questions must be resolved before DNA data can be used 
effectively, economically and in a timely manner to fight transnational crime under the 
Prüm Council Decisions. Technical implementation still poses major problems for some 
states and diverse national legal procedures and organisational structures can impede or 
delay follow-up action after a DNA match has been achieved. Access to DNA profiles and 
fingerprints held in national databases is granted on a ‘hit/no-hit’ basis, which means that 
DNA profiles or fingerprints found at a crime scene in one EU State can be compared with 
profiles held in the databases of other EU States. Figure 1 depicts the countries currently 
exchanging DNA data under the Prüm Convention. 
Several strategic questions are posed regarding how to maximize the benefit of exchanging 
forensic bioinformation – fingerprints as well as DNA – in compliance with EU and member 
state legal and ethical norms. The role of Northumbria University academics within the 
wider PIES project is within the fourth strand of research activity: the ‘Strategic analysis of 
the benefit of the Prüm DNA exchange’. To gain an understanding of the social, economic 
and political drivers of transnational crime and the movement of offenders across state 
boundaries in order to inform the development of potential crime prevention, reduction 
and detection methodologies [26].  
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Literature Review 
Migration is a complex and diverse field of interdisciplinary enquiry spanning a variety of 
scales of examination and impact (e.g. global, regional, international, national, local). 
Human migration has been explored for decades and, recent, advances in genetic 
technology have turned it into a truly global scale of enquiry tracing the histories of the 
movement of people [27].  
Rystad (1992) recognised that migration must be considered as a permanent rather than 
temporary phenomenon [28]. He introduced the concept of ‘intraregional’ migration 
(migration within a limited geographical area, e.g. from less developed to better developed 
countries and regions), suggesting a shift away from ‘transcontinental’ migration, the more 
dominant concept at the time [28]. Due to the significant instability which existed within the 
USSR (as it was then known) and many eastern European countries at the time of his 
writing, predictions of future intraregional migration from eastern to western Europe were 
already apparent, contrasting the trend of existing intercontinental migratory patterns [28]. 
It was during this time that the EU and the Schengen agreement seeking border free 
movement for member populations had been developed but not yet enacted. Intraregional 
migration within Europe was not new, the Second World War had hit all countries hard and 
there was a need to rebuild labour markets using targeted immigration and the relaxation of 
immigration rules was a tactic employed by many Western European countries. EU 
expansion and constantly improving technology impacting travel and communication 
stretched the parameters beyond any model and scale previously considered. By the mid-
1990s inter-country travel was fast, cheap and reliable; communication was similarly 
expanding by booming technological advances.  
It was during the late 1980s/early 1990s that cross-border crime became an issue of EU 
focus, although it had first been discussed a decade before. In 1995, Solomon identified a 
significant growing problem of organised crime within the EU, which he suggested would 
lead to “the demise of the Union in economic and global markets” [29] unless a unified force 
was developed to tackle it; an issue receiving attention at that time through the 
development of Europol, the European Union’s law enforcement agency.  
The increase in global travel and legitimate trading (of services, commodities and products) 
has affected and created opportunities for illegal activities and movement of people for 
legitimate and illegitimate purposes apparent within Europe due to  free and unrestricted 
movement within and between EU member states [30, 31].  
Growing from 6 to 28 member states over 40 years, table 1 maps the expansion of the EU, 
providing a timeline of development, labelling of accession waves and the introduction of 
free movement caveats [31]. This timeline illustrates that the notion of the ‘freedom of 
movement’ becomes somewhat devolved from 2004 due to the restrictions implemented 
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on Central & East European (CEE) countries by postponing the opening of the labour 
markets and limiting access to welfare benefits for a maximum of seven years. Accession 
rules have been fully examined over the years [32-37], the impact of migration flows 
appears to have been dependent, at least to some degree, upon restriction rules set by 
receiving member states [38-40].  
Estimations of migration flows from the A8 accession countries differed from the expected 
[38] as many projections were benchmarked against free, unrestricted movement of labour 
across all EU member states which ultimately did not materialise. This mixed application of 
accession restrictions diverted “migration flows away from countries which pursued a 
restrictive immigration policy” to countries with no such implementation or fewer 
restrictions [32]. 
 




































Label: EU15 Label: A81 Label: A22  
  Label: (Collectively)  A10   
1 All but the UK, Ireland & Sweden imposed various interim restrictions on A8 nationals protecting 
internal labour and economic markets. 
2 Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia allowed the A2 
unrestricted access. Majority imposed interim labour market/welfare restrictions. Spain initially 
allowed unrestricted access. In July 2011 it introduced restrictions for Romanian workers until the 
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Traditional patterns of migration within the EU were generally South to North, with the 
Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal being countries of 
emigration [41] and migrants moving to the North and West. Migration trends have 
changed more recently and since 2004 the shape of intra-EU migration patterns has 
generally been from East to West [42, 43]. The countries receiving the largest numbers of 
intra- EU immigrants have been Germany, Spain, Italy and the UK [44, 45]. These patterns 
suggest that some countries which have traditionally had high emigration such as Spain and 
Italy, have recently attracted large amounts of immigration from newer EU member states 
[45]. 
The UK has been the most common destination of A8 migrants [46] although It has been 
suggested that the UK’s decision not to impose controls on A8 migrants was significant [47]. 
It has also been argued by a UK Think Tank that in considering migration the Government 
and others have tended to focus only on numbers of migrants, with policy aimed at reducing 
net migration numbers48, ignoring the complex drivers behind decisions to migrate [48]. 
Migration from some countries has now slowed from the rate seen in the wake of EU 
enlargement. In 2011, high return migration was reported in Lithuania, Portugal, Croatia, 
Estonia and Greece [45]. Despite this, there was more emigration than immigration 
reported by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Poland, Romania, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia. 
A lesser explored pattern of migration is that of wealthy migrants from Northern Europe to 
the Mediterranean area, particularly Spain [49]. Much of the literature on migration has 
been concerned with the migration of people from poor countries to countries perceived as 
more affluent [50]. Little attention has been paid to the movement of wealthy people, who 
are able to travel freely between countries, or to the migration from Northern Europe to 
Spain, by both the wealthy and the working class. As a consequence of tourism, large 
numbers of Northern Europeans, particularly from Germany and the UK, have moved to the 
Mediterranean area, either intending to work or to retire [51]. Factors such as the climate 
and the perceived better value for money, cheaper property and better quality of life have 
influenced decision to migrate [52], although the global financial crisis from 2008 is likely to 
have impacted this perception by some. This pattern of migration is also favoured by 
criminal entrepreneurs, who choose to conduct their illicit businesses from Spanish coastal 
areas, where they are relatively unknown to local authorities [49]. 
Migration has traditionally been seen as a one time, permanent move to a new country [52, 
53]. Increasingly, new types of spatial mobility are emerging with moves seen as less 
permanent, and the distinction between migration and tourism has become blurred. In 
particular, a substantial (but unknown) proportion of the migration of young workers from 
Eastern to Western Europe following the EU enlargement has been circular, with many 
returning home after some time [30]. In the case of migration to Spain or other 
[Page 23 of 103] 
  
Mediterranean resorts, that migration is often not a permanent move but a seasonal or a 
temporary one [51]. 
 
Drivers of migration 
In 2004 ten new countries joined the EU, of which eight were in Central and Eastern Europe 
and labelled the A8 countries. This enlargement essentially increased the population of the 
EU by 75 million in one go [54]. At the time, these countries had emerged from Communist 
rule with very different political and social cultures to the existing 15 EU member states. 
Suddenly, citizens became ‘free’ to move to other member states, as well as within their 
own. After years of mobility being restricted by Communist rule, citizens of the A8 countries 
were granted freedom of movement [43], the core of EU citizenship [30, 55]. 
The accession of the eight CEE countries in 2004 saw the largest income difference between 
the incumbent EU15 member countries and new member states [32], an important driver 
for migration [56] given the great disparity in wages between West and East Europe [57, 
58]. Warnings about job seekers and ‘welfare scroungers’ added to the already anxious 
British population about the impact of globalisation and seemed to justify fears of mass 
migration if free movement of labour was permitted [56]. The largest migrations have 
occurred from the poorest economies of the new member states, which also tend to have 
higher unemployment rates [59]. The average wage in Latvia, the poorest A8 country, was 
just one-eighth of the EU15 average in 2003. However, the wage gap between many A8 
countries and the EU average has been drastically reduced but still remains substantial. The 
“rapid convergence” of wages resulted from the “combined effect of high wage dynamics in 
A8 countries and the appreciation of their national currencies against the euro” [56]. 
Migration behaviour is commonly characterised in terms of a push-pull approach, which 
consists of factors which attract immigration and factors that stimulate emigration [60]. The 
former are pull factors determining the choice of the destination country, whilst push 
factors determine the decision to emigrate. Push and pull factors include income levels and 
employment opportunities with significant income gaps between new and old members 
being a cause of concern for some EU15 governments, potentially leading to an excessive 
influx of workers. 
It has been shown that shared characteristics between countries such as language or 
cultural affinity are important in migrants’ choice of destination [61]. Migration for study 
tends to be temporary, although some may choose to stay on after completing their studies. 
Some migrants, particularly of the new wave of young EU citizens with the right to free 
mobility, move as a lifestyle choice [30, 62].  
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Concerns about whether immigrants may depress wages, cause unemployment, exploit 
social security systems, and generate social tensions have been contrasted with scientific 
emphasis on the economic need for skilled workers by native firms and the creative 
potential immigrants may possess. In general, the economic impact of immigration on 
receiving labour markets depends on the scale of immigration flows, composition of the 
migrating population, and the functioning of the receiving economy [58]. 
Studies of the economic impact of immigration in general conclude that while it has a 
positive impact on the public finances, it decreases wages and the employment prospects 
for certain groups, in particular the low skilled [63]. Intra-EU mobility might be thought to 
have a greater negative impact, because governments are unable to control the skill level of 
inflows into a particular area, meaning there is a greater risk of an influx of workers 
competing for low-skilled jobs. The few studies that disaggregate intra-EU mobility from 
immigration more broadly find no evidence that this has occurred [64]. 
Western European countries are considered by some to have reaped economic benefits 
[43], gaining hard-working, relatively cheap labour to fill jobs deemed unacceptable by 
many of the host country’s population. While powerful Western European countries have 
gained a workforce, including many who are highly educated or skilled, the countries they 
have left behind have been considered by some to have suffered “brain drain”, losing a 
large proportion of their most educated young people [62, 65]. The employment of these 
qualified migrants is usually in jobs at a lower level than their skills and education reflects, 
often referred to as dirty, dangerous or dull jobs [66]. This tendency to accept jobs at a 
lower level than would probably have been aspired to at home is seen by some as a waste 
of talents, or “brain waste” [62]. 
Within Europe, female migrants from the Eastern European accession countries have also 
been affected by deskilling – the bulk of migrants since 2004 have filled low skilled jobs in 
old EU countries [67]. Academic research and policy studies of migrant women’s 
employment usually focus on those who enter the highly feminised and lesser skilled 
reproductive sectors of the labour market, such as sex work [68, 69], domestic work [70], 
and more recently care work [71]. Female migrants have often entered Europe as part of 
family re-unification schemes.  
While the economic impact of EU migration has been broadly positive, social impacts are 
very difficult to measure, it being difficult to disaggregate intra-EU migration from other 
forms. Communities suffer when the pace of change applies pressure on local 
infrastructure, but many of the problems faced by mobile EU citizens following the recession 
were shared by other groups [64]. Migrations can be spectacular or mundane, or regarded 
as problematic or non-problematic. By and large, the mundane, unproblematic forms of 
movement are left unrecorded and often unstudied. The spectacular, problematic ones 
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receive all the attention, although here it must be stressed that the nature of the ‘spectacle’ 
is often exaggerated and distorted by its media portrayal and politicisation [72]. 
Despite the economic depression which has affected most of Europe over recent years, 
Eurostat data indicates that in 2011 approximately 3 million migrated to one of the 28 EU 
member states [73], of which approximately 1.3 million immigrated within EU member 
states [74]. There were also an estimated 20.7 million non-EU nationals residing in the EU 
(4.1% of the EU28 population) [75]. 
Labour mobility from the A8 to the EU15 has decreased since 2008. This trend can be 
attributed to a reduction of the migration potential of those countries, due to improved 
labour market conditions in some origin countries, and to the economic crisis affecting the 
main receiving countries among the EU25, with the consequent decline in labour demand 
[40]. 
Even before their accession into the EU, Spain and Italy received a large number of 
immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria. This was further facilitated by continued bilateral 
agreements and specific legislations and large regularisation held in Italy in 2002, and Spain 
in 2005 which allowed “many illegally employed Romanian workers to appear in the 
statistics of work permits” [40]. Spain appears to be the main destination country for A2 
migrants, followed by Germany, the UK and Austria [33]. Common linguistic roots and high 
labour demand – both formal and informal – in specific sectors such as construction and 
domestic and elderly care, together with the favourable regulatory framework foreseen in 
bilateral agreements, have been the main drivers for A2 workers’ inflows into Spain and 
Italy. The large increase in those inflows constituted an important pull factor for Romanian 
and Bulgarian workers into Italy and Spain, at a time when their opportunities for legal 
immigration for employment were largely restricted [40]. 
 
Who is a migrant 
The classification and counting of nationals and foreign nationals is commonplace across 
Europe [76] but not necessarily displaying common practice. Nationality is often regarded as 
the most appropriate means of measuring international mobility. The categorisation of the 
ethnic status in official statistics tends to follow two traditions. In most southern European 
countries, the distinction is based on nationality (the national and the foreigner (EU and the 
non-EU)) [77]. Northern European countries classify migrants relating to their ethnic or 
origin background. For example, the UK uses a system of self-identification for ethnicity, the 
Netherlands categorise its population according to the country of birth of the parents and 
the individual (regardless of whether they hold Dutch nationality or not) [77]. Belgium is 
divided between the French and the Dutch speaking sectors; the French speaking part 
follows France in refusing ethnic categorisation, whereas the Dutch speaking part 
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distinguish between ‘allochtones’ and ‘autochtones’, where allochtones is used to refer to 
immigrant-origin (non EU) inhabitants [77]. Except for some prison statistics, official data in 
France distinguish only between French citizens and “foreigners” and does not make 
distinctions based on “race” or “ethnic group”. This is true of administrative statistics and of 
studies and surveys in the social sciences [78].  
Delineation between nationalities within data categories therefore becomes problematic for 
the researcher and presents risk in terms of the integrity of migration/population 
information to inform high level policy. Within England it has been highlighted that poor 
delineation of nationality with the 2011 national census population survey impacts on the 
derivation of suitable contextual rates of intra-EU migrant offending to the extent of 
rendering such context provision unusable (146). 
 
Mobility of criminals 
The increasingly mobile nature of crime in Europe has been facilitated by several factors. It 
is generally agreed that the opening of borders under the Schengen agreement has 
contributed to cross-border crime [11, 79-82]. This new ease of travel across borders has 
both increased legitimate cross-border routine activities, and reduced the obstacles to 
transnational offending. The increased permeability of borders has caused Eastern 
European criminal organisations in particular, to rapidly expand their operations across 
Europe [83]. Criminal enterprises have developed internationally to exploit differences in 
different legal systems [83]. The establishment of a single market and increased cross-
border trade has brought more individuals and organisations into contact with those in 
other countries [83]. The increasing sophistication of criminal entrepreneurs, along with 
developments in communication technologies have also made a significant contribution [13, 
83]. 
Since the late 1990s, Belgian law enforcement identified an increasing number of offenders 
engaging in property crimes, with a high level of mobility [84]. These groups were labelled 
‘itinerant crime groups’, and after a number of years of fine-tuning the phenomenon, it was 
defined and recorded in Belgian criminal policy. Key features of these groups are: systematic 
offending, offending in groups, groups involving individuals from Eastern European origin 
and operating from Belgian cities or abroad [85, 86].  
Investigating itinerant crime groups, Daele and Beken (2010) identified Eastern European 
offenders as a separate group (the others being: ‘Belgian’ nationality and ‘other’ 
nationalities) [87]. They included nationals from what used to be the Eastern Bloc, including 
the former Soviet republics and the Soviet satellite states, but also including the countries 
that were covered by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania [88]. They found that 
more than 60% of offences committed by Belgian offenders were committed less than 10km 
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(6.2 miles) from home. However, only 32% of Eastern European offenders committed 
offences close to home. The distance travelled by Eastern European offenders was found to 
be nearly double that of other offenders [88]. 
Ponsaers (2004) estimated that these groups were responsible for about 25% of all property 
crimes in Belgium [89]. Organised property crime committed by these groups has been 
raising concern not only in Belgium, but also in some of its neighbouring countries, under a 
variety of names (‘mobile banditism’ in the Netherlands [90], ‘itinerant crime’ in France and 
‘Eastern European criminal groups’ in Germany [91].  
 
Migration and crime 
There has been political and media interest in the relationship between migration and crime 
[92]. The question of whether migrants commit more crimes than natives has been explored 
to some degree in literature, but there has been little empirical research to date. In 
countries hosting large numbers of immigrants, crime has been blamed on foreigners (in 
general, not just EU immigrants) for many years [93, 94]. In some foreign nationals have 
been blamed for increasing crime rates by the media, who have sensationalised stories of 
foreign criminals, and in some cases have driven calls for restricting immigration or 
deporting foreign criminals [95]. 
A number of studies have looked at the link between immigration and crime with varying 
degrees of success. Many of these studies focus on specific aspects; some compared rates of 
immigration and crime [96-98], others looked at crime rates by native and non-native 
offenders [78, 99, 100], or investigated foreigners as a percentage of the prison population 
[93, 101, 102]. A comprehensive and broad literature search has revealed less than 15 
academically published studies with a tentative EU migration and crime emphasis (see table 
2). 
Solivetti (2012) found that although the immigrants share in crime figures varies by country, 
on average immigrant crime rates are two to four times higher than the rest of society [93]. 
He also states that, in contrast, in the US, Canada and Australia immigrant crime rates are 
similar to that of the native population [93]. This difference supports the argument that 
immigrant crime is not directly caused by immigration alone. 
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Table 2: Overview of the empirical studies that have investigated EU migration and crime 
Focus of study Countries included Sources Author(s) 
Immigration 
rates vs crime 
rates 
Germany Chapin (1997) [96] 
Italy The National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT) Bianchi et al. (2008) [98] 
France 
Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE), Institut 
National d’Études Démographiques (INED), Ministère de la Santè et des Solidarités 
Aoki & Todo (2009) [103] 
England 
Office of National Statistics (ONS), Worker Registration Scheme (WRS),  
National Asylum Support Service (NASS) 
Bell & Machin (2011) [97] 
EU15 Solivetti (2010) [55] 





Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE), Institut 
National d’Études Démographiques (INED), Ministère de la Santè et des Solidarités 
Tournier (1997) [78] 
Germany & Denmark Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik (PKS) Entorf & Larsen (2004) [99] 
Italy The National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT) Crocitti (2014) [105] 





USA, Australia, UK, Canada, Japan, France, Germany Lynch & Simon (1999) [101] 
Europe Melossi (2003) [106] 
England Ministry of Justice Banks (2011) [102] 
Italy & rest of Europe Solivettti (2012)    [93] 





Spain Ministerio del Interior (MIR) 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE) 
Alonso-Borrego et al. (2008) [108] 
Spain Alonso-Borrego & Vazquez (2012) [92] 
Spain 
Statistical Institute of Catalonia, Moso d’Esquadra,  
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE) 
Westbrook (2013) [109] 
Netherlands Police Recognition System, Social Statistical Database (CBS) Blom & Jennison (2014) [110] 
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Bianchi et al. (2012) examined the relationship between crime and immigration in Italy, 
estimating that a 1% increase in migrants could be associated with a 0.1% increase in total 
crime, an effect stronger for property crimes, especially robbery and theft [104]. In Spain, 
Alonso-Borrego et al. (2012) noted the political and public concerns regarding global 
migrants and crime but also that there was a distinct correlation between the two over the 
preceding decade [92]. Bell and Machin (2013) carried out a number of studies examining 
the relationship between migration and crime in the UK [97, 107]. Using two different 
immigration groups – asylum seekers from the late 1990s and early 2000s, and A8 migrants 
– they examined the impact of migration on violent and property crimes [107]. They found 
no significant effects on violent crime rates, a “modestly positive” correlation between 
asylum seekers and property crimes and a “significantly negative” correlation between A8 
and property crimes [107].  
An explanation offered by scholars for the link between migration and crime is that migrants 
may be more likely to offend than natives because of the poorer economic conditions they 
face [93]. Immigrant crime may be a result of the experiences of immigrants in host 
countries [111]; an inability to achieve societal goals and success, or even a basic standard 
of living, through legitimate means (for example not being permitted to work or claim 
benefits) leading some to choosing criminal means to obtain their goals or needs [111].  
It has long been argued in economic literature that criminal activity is related to lack of 
available legal opportunities, and that people engage in criminality because their costs and 
benefits differ from law-abiding people [112]. It therefore follows that EU migrants who are 
in employment (and with suitable conditions and pay) are no more likely to commit 
property crime than any other nationality, but may turn to acquisitive crimes if they face 
limited labour market opportunities [113].  
It has been suggested that offending is more likely to be committed by newly arrived 
migrants, and that as migrants become more settled and familiar with local ways and 
expectations their criminality decreases [114]. There is evidence that countries with better 
immigrant integration policies have experienced crime by foreign nationals [101]. The rights 
granted to EU member state nationals should allow for easy immigration and integration 
into a destination country, however it is not always easy [115] and is likely to have been 
more difficult for Romanian and Bulgarian nationals than other EU nationalities, due to 
restrictions place on them. 
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Age, gender and crime types committed by foreign nationals 
Hirschi and Gottfredson (1984) determined that the age of offenders committing crimes 
against individuals (14-19 year olds) “peak later than property crimes” (19-24 year olds), and 
the rate declines more slowly with age [116]. Nagin and Land (1993) conducted a study on 
individual offending patterns – asking whether offending rates varied with age and whether 
the age-crime curve peaked or was flat [117]. They found that the individual-level average 
offense rate (per unit of time) varies as a function of observable individual-level 
characteristics and the age trajectory of the offense rate is generally single peaked rather 
than flat. 
In 1986, Farrington was the first scholar to examine knowledge surrounding the age crime 
curve in detail. The age-crime curve shows criminal activity grows steadily from a young age, 
peaks at around 17 years old and then declines somewhat quickly as the offender gets older 
[118]. Further work in 2003 identified that the age of onset of offending was most typically 
between ages 8 and 14, earlier with self-report data and later with official records, while the 
age of desistance from offending is typically between 20 and 29 (though a small subset of 
offenders continue well into adulthood). He also found that different types of offences tend 
to be first committed at distinctly different ages [119]. A subsequent study by Farrington 
(2006) found that the most prolific offenders start early and have long criminal careers 
[120]. Almost all of those who were first convicted at ages 10–13 (91%) or 14–16 (84%) did 
not give up offending after the first offence. On the contrary, they continued offending 
(according to convictions) for an average of 13 years. Those who started at age 10–13 
averaged nine convictions and those who started at age 14–16 averaged six convictions. In 
contrast, those who were first convicted at age 17 or older averaged only about two 
convictions each. Hence, an important policy aim should be to prevent (or postpone) the 
early onset of offending. 
Francis et al. (2004) state that age of first conviction can determine the length of a criminal 
career [121]. The estimate mean length for a male offender first convicted at the age of less 
than 15 is just less than 10 years. Similar to findings from Farrington (2006) however 
younger first conviction rate is linked with longer age profile rather than less frequent 
offending [120]. A correlation between age and crime and the peak in adolescence and 
decline was identified [116, 119], and Hirschi and Gottfredson (1984) claim the relationship 
between age and crime is ‘invariant’ regardless of sex, race, country, time or offence; age 
had a ‘direct effect’ on crime [116].  
The nature of crime by different nationalities has received little direct academic attention in 
Europe [110]. Work in the UK has tended to aggregate crime by foreign nationals broadly, 
ignoring differences between nationalities and in the type of crime committed [94]. 
Anecdotal evidence from ACPO, Cambridgeshire Police, and criminal justice professionals 
interviewed for qualitative studies [114, 122], suggest that there are certain crime types 
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which EU migrants have a tendency to favour. However, there is no previous robust 
evidence to suggest that these migrants are more likely to commit particular types of crime.  
This paper continues with a review of literature relating to EU immigration and crime, 
theoretical explanations of immigrant crime, and summary of existing evidence, followed by 
the research methodology, results and discussion of findings. 
An unpublished report by the U.K. Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO: redefined April 
2015 as the National Police Chiefs Council but referred to throughout this report as ACPO 
due to chronological linkage) on the impact of accession migration on crime and policing in 
2008 claimed there was no evidence of the suggested Eastern European crime wave, but 
that East Europeans were more likely to commit certain types of offences. Whilst remaining 
unpublished the reports existence and part content is echoed through media coverage and 
reference by senior Police Officers within governmental committee hearings.  
According to the varied media coverage of the report, it specified people trafficking and 
exploitation, Polish people drink driving, Romanian children used to commit robberies [123]; 
public order, violence, pick-pocketing, extortion and alcohol related offences [124]. A 
further report by the House of Commons [125] stated an association between Eastern 
European migrants and alcohol related criminality, debt related assaults and labour and sex 
trafficking. The report does go on to emphasise that migrants are no more likely to be 
involved in crime than the native population. This is echoed by Baker et al. (2012), whose 
interviews with criminal justice system professional in Wales suggested that migrants did 
not offend any more than the native population but that when they did it was more visible 
than natives offending [114]. They also found that accession migrants were associated with 
certain offences (alcohol related, driving offences, domestic violence and shoplifting) and 
not associated with violent offences generally [114].   
Stansfield (2014) tested the impact of Polish, Lithuanian and Romanian immigration, as well 
as all recent immigration, on total crime and different crime types at Local Authority level, 
using immigration data from the U.K. Office of National Statistics (ONS), and crime data 
from data.gov.uk [113]. The analysis showed that recent immigration is not associated with 
murder, robbery or sex offences but is linked to drug offences. His analysis also appeared to 
show that areas with the highest proportions of Polish nationals in the population have 
higher rates of robbery and sexual offences, although these correlations are not present 
when structural disadvantage is controlled for. No association was found between 
Lithuanian and Romanian immigration and any crime types [113].   
Greek research has identified that the proportion of offenders who are foreign varies by 
crime type: highest for begging, followed by robbery and theft, and low for bodily injury 
offences [126]. Bianchi et al. (2008), looking at reported crimes in Italian provinces found 
that the causal effect of immigration on violent, property and drug crimes was not 
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significant [98]. The only crime type found to be significantly and positively affected by 
immigration was robbery. 
Alonso-Borrego et al. (2008) found that rates of property crimes in Spain were higher for 
foreigners than natives, especially Algerians and Romanians. They further suggest some 
degree of specialisation according to nationality, identifying that Romanians concentrate in 
property offences and Moroccans in drug trafficking [108].  Their theory of specialisation 
according to nationality is supported by Dutch research [110] who also found differences in 
the types of crime favoured by different immigrant groups. In particular Eastern Europeans 
were shown to have a far higher rate for property crimes than other crimes and Latin 
Americans have higher rate for drug-related crimes than anything else.   
Previous American research has found that immigration increased property crime and 
robberies, but did not affect rape and assault [127]. Spenkuch (2014) suggests that these 
findings indicate that it is financially motivated crimes which are most related to 
immigration, but that this relationship will vary according to the different labour market 
outcomes of different nationalities [127]. Other research also suggests that limited access to 
legitimate opportunities can lead to more crime [128]. 
Belmonte et al. [129] investigated links between immigration and crime in Spain.  They 
found that both immigrants and natives have contributed to the increase in the crime rate. 
However, the contribution of immigrants seems to be relatively higher, partly explained by 
immigration contributing to an increase in the collective males aged 20 – 50 who are 
responsible for most offences. They found significant differences in the behaviour of 
immigrants towards crime by their nationality of origin, suggesting nationality influences 
age/gender/crime type. The crime gap between immigrants and natives is moderate, and 
can be largely explained by a higher propensity of immigrants to commit minor offences. 
This type of crime, although being the less serious, generates a strong perception of 
insecurity among native populations, but its number has decreased in recent years.  
Research by Northumbria University included a significant literature searching and review 
exercise of which this report provides succinct coverage. Academic literature on migrant 
crime was found to be limited, contemporary criminological and geography discipline 
studies tending to focus more on organised crime involving cross border offending activity 
with limited outputs on offending by non- nationals within an EU Member State.  
This lack of established material identified substantial knowledge gaps in terms of the 
offending by intra-EU migrants within member states and the potential diversity of spatial 
offending contexts and attributes of offending groups within intra-EU migrant nationalities. 
Poor understanding of such context impacts on the ability to provide suitably informed 
strategies of resourcing criminal justice assets and developing informed crime prevention 
policies. Consequently knowledge gaps provided the required drivers to the Northumbria 
project of developing a clear understanding of the spatial and human/criminal career 
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attributes of intra-EU migrant offenders. The project objectives sought to develop an 
analytical model of intra-EU migrant offending transferable across project partner member 
states to identify the nature and diversity of such offending. 
Whilst not a signatory to Prüm the UK presented the opportunity to develop a suitable 
‘pilot’ analytical model given the knowledge contained within the research team concerning 
the type, volume and accessibility of suitably geo-referenced criminal justice and 
crime/offending data held by public authorities. Research work therefore followed two 
distinct avenues namely: 
1. Development of a transferable, robust and intuitive analytical model of intra-EU 
migrant offending within England between 2011 and 2013 and 
2. Exploration of data existence and public availability within project partner member 
states (and wider) to accommodate the transferability of a UK based analytical 
model 
The review of literature identified three particular aspects of such an analytical model 
lacking in contemporary knowledge but potentially impactive on policy consideration, 
namely the spatial nature/diversity of offending, the age/career profile of migrant offenders 
and the types of crime committed in host countries. The project remit required the use of 
publicly available data so allowing national scale pictures to be developed. 
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Methods and Results 
Freedom of Information Act (2000) 
Data applicable to this research was of two forms, namely socio-economic data generally 
available such as population and labour statistics typically drawn from central government 
funded inclusive surveys or governance activities and specific sub-sets of crime related data 
generated from with the criminal justice system. In order to investigate patterns of 
migration and crime in England, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA 2000) was utilised 
[130]. The Act came into force in 2005 and requires public authorities to provide access to 
any information held, albeit with certain exemptions. Requests require two initial stages: 
determining whether the requested information is held, and what staff costs will be 
incurred during the extraction and provision of the data. Public bodies will freely provide 
data incurring low staff costs, but may require payment prior to collection and data release 
if the cost is more substantial. Police compliance with the FOIA has been found to be 
positive [131, 132]. 
The act is a resource providing access to data that may otherwise be unavailable, usually 
due to remaining unpublished. It was implemented to end the ‘entrenched culture of 
secrecy’ established in UK Government in the 1990s [133]; moving towards improving 
transparency, openness and increasing public trust and accountability in the public sector 
[134, 135]. The Act is also considered to represent progress in reducing the barriers to data 
[132, 136], granting access to a valuable range of material otherwise inaccessible or 
problematic to obtain.  
Legislation providing access to information and data held by governments and public 
agencies is not however an English phenomenon. Banisar (2006) notes it being apparent in 
70 countries worldwide whilst in progression with 50 others [137], Hazell and Worthy (2010) 
extend progress to 90 countries with freedom of information structures apparent in their 
article four years later [138]. The United Kingdom was one of the last countries of the 
developed world to adopt such access legislation [139].   
Data was requested from 39 police forces in England relating to the nationalities and 
offences committed by non-native offenders [140, 141]. In total three requests were made: 
 FOI request 1: please provide data relating to the number of foreign nationals 
charged with an offence and the crime type charged with, for the calendar year 2011 
and 2012.  
 FOI request 2: please provide data relating to the number of foreign nationals 
charged with an offence and the crime type charged with, for the calendar year 2012 
and 2013.  
 FOI request 3: please provide data relating to the number of foreign nationals 
charged with an offence, the offence charged, the age and gender of the offender for 
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each of the following nationalities:  Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Latvian, 
Lithuanian, Czech, Italian, Irish and Slovakian; for the calendar year 2012. 
Data requests retained a focus on persons charged with a criminal offence. As opposed to 
arrested or convicted, charging of an offence falls between the two. Charging is the lawful 
process formally notifying an arrestee of the intention to prosecute. Following an arrest and 
subsequent investigation, evidence for all but some minor offences are referred to a 
prosecution lawyer to determine whether a formal charge is appropriate and what that 
criminal offence is. This is a step beyond an arrest which seeks to secure evidence for an 
investigation. Significantly low level offences can be dealt with post arrest through non-
court procedures (e.g. formal cautions or penalty notices for disorder that require a fixed 
sum fine rather than a formal charge). 
Within England four broad categories of crime data detailing a known offender exist: 
 Crimes recorded by the police as ‘detected/resolved’, 
 People arrested by the police for criminal offences, 
 People arrested and charged with a criminal offence by the police or 
 People convicted at court of a criminal offence. 
Of these, the majority of English Police forces could or would not provide details of the 
nationality of the individual recorded within detected crime reports due to limited data 
collection. For convictions the English court system followed suit; courts are additionally 
unable to provide spatial information concerning a conviction beyond stating which court 
(geographically) dealt with the case. Some forces were able to provide information relating 
to the nationality of individuals arrested for a specific criminal offence, but as a criminal 
justice measure arrests provided inconclusive information on the true nature of the offence 
committed or a suitable measure of potential guilt.  
Across England it is the individual Police Forces who retain ownership and responsibility for 
the recording of crimes and subsequent investigation activity leading to identification of an 
offender. Reporting up the governance chain to the optimal level of national government, 
the 39 English Police forces remain the data creators, holders and owners. In the majority of 
cases Police Force areas are coterminous with County areas, or at least very closely 
associated. Use of areal units representing the spatial extent of policing responsibility held 
by individual forces therefore becomes a suitable and data relevant scale of spatial 
examination. 
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Request 1: 2011 data – main results 
Police Forces were requested to provide the number of persons charged during 2011 
(calendar year) by nationality, figure 2 displaying the areal units represented in the context 
of England as the macro scale and identifying those forces unable to supply data for 2011.  
- Six were unable to provide data, unable to provide data freely or provided data in a 
format that could not be aligned in a satisfactory manner with other forces.  
- Data from the Metropolitan Police Force (outer London) and the City of London 




Figure 2: English Police Force areas requested to supply data 
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Crime figures for 2011 for all Police forces indicated that EU nationals charged with offences 
accounted for approximately 1% of all recorded crime in the UK [142]. Of the 27 EU 
nationalities examined (Croatia excluded) 74% of all prosecution charges aligned with A8 
and A2 nationalities. Poland, Romania and Lithuania accounted for 59% of all prosecution 
charges against non UK EU nationals. 
Statistical analysis was carried out using the Median and Absolute Deviation (MAD) factor 
analysis (a description of this technique can be found in appendix 1), to test data diversity. 
This technique identified six nationalities of interest: Latvia, Lithuanian, Polish, Romanian, 
Italian and Portuguese. 
Measures of spatial autocorrelation were employed for the counts of charges by nationality, 
rates of migrant charges per nationality by force area population and lastly by force area 
total 2011 crime [146]. Further analysis using Morans I was carried out and provided a 
global value accounting for spatial diversity of such offending across England. Local Morans I 
measures each Police Force area indicating its similarity or dissimilarity with neighbours and 
was also applied. 
Morans I indicates positive spatial autocorrelation is exhibited by all but Italian, Latvian and 
Polish crime counts, however, it is only Romanian offending rates per total force crime and 
rates per force area population which are considered statistically significant (p = 0.001). 
Local Morans I provide an indication of the similarity or dissimilarity between neighbouring 
regions/forces. A positive Local Morans I value indicates a Police Force area which has 
neighbouring areas displaying similarly high or low attribute values. The Force area is part of 
a cluster of similar attributes (albeit reference must be made to the observed value to 
identify whether this is a ‘hot’ or ‘cold’ spot). A negative value indicates neighbouring Force 
areas with dissimilar values, suggesting it is an outlier. These values can only be considered 
significant when in view of corresponding standardised Z scores [143]. 
Local Morans I values were calculated for all the Force areas that provided data. For each 
nationality, a high negative Z score greater than 3 was apparent for London, accentuating its 
outlier status due to extreme counts of charges. High values outside of London were limited 
in number and only in the case of Romanians were values > 1.96 seen (see figure 3). 
Charges against Romanian migrants display positive ‘hot’ clustering with regard to rates 
against the total crime for force areas in a zone best described as the South East. South 
Yorkshire displays a positive Z score but with low intensity indicating clustering as a ‘cold’ 
spot. Polish and Latvian’s both display ‘hot’ activity in Lincolnshire (East coast), however for 
Polish nationalities a negative Z score reported indicated Lincolnshire as an outlier of Polish 
activity, whereas for Latvians it is clearly indicating ‘hot’ clustering in this zone of Police 
Force areas. Additionally for Poles, Cumbria (North) is a high value outlier whilst Surrey 
(South East) is one of low value. 




Figure 3: Police Force areas displaying Local Morans I adjusted Z scores >1.96 with high value 
intensity measurements. 
 
Lithuanian and Latvian nationals highlight the Eastern zone as containing police force areas 
displaying high MAD factor values (>2), with the exception of the rate of charges per 
Lithuanian population. The spatial distribution of Lithuanian and Latvian nationals 
committing crime to a comparatively high volume is clearly focused throughout the East and 
parts of the South East. In the South East there is inconsistency between these two 
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nationalities; Lithuanian’s featuring to a greater degree in London and especially Sussex 
whilst Latvian focus remains on Essex, Kent and London.  
The distribution is relatively distinctive from other nationalities analysed, and may be due to 
specific land use in the East (e.g. agribusiness related which potentially utilises a high 
number of seasonal workers). McCollum et al. (2013) report on spatial, sectoral and 
temporal trends of A8 migrant labour, noting an influx to particular labour market sectors 
such as agriculture and service industries [144]. Their analysis suggests that whilst 
agriculture employs only about 1% of the population, one quarter of those employees in 
2011 could have been from A8 countries. 
It is only Latvians who display extreme values in Western zone force areas as a rate per total 
population or per total force crime although both Latvian and Lithuanian nationalities 
feature in the area of Staffordshire, together with other nationalities. Polish nationality 
maps display a far more general dispersal across the country with Hampshire (South coast) 
consistently high in MAD factor values. There is little evidence beyond this feature of a 
spatial concentration of activity. 
Polish nationality maps (see figure 4) suggest more general spatial diversity but drawn to 
the South and East. High MAD factor values routinely appear in Cambridgeshire and in terms 
of EU or nationality population also in Cumbria although actual counts in Cumbria are 
extremely low and therefore of limited value.  
Counts of prosecution charges against Italians identify London and adjacent force areas in 
the South as high in volume. No other rates used corroborate this impact, high values being 
limited to London except on consideration of the rate per Italian population, which is in the 
low hundreds for many force areas displaying a high rate. Italian’s charged in London 
amounted to 1,514, the next highest area being Greater Manchester at 50 and all other 
areas ranging from 0 to 35, therefore displaying no spatial diversity outside of London [146]. 
Analysis and Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping of available data confirms 
anticipated patterns of criminal activity regarding A8 and A2 migrants, but notes a wider 
potential dispersion of Polish and other EU nationalities which have a longer time line of 
movement into the UK. Particularly apparent is distinctly low criminal activity in a central 
zone of England with high activity in selected force areas dependent on the zone in which 
they exist and the nationality of the immigrants in question. 
Interrogation of publicly available socio-economic data and subsequent analysis highlighted 
the poor integrity of population data with regard to counts by nationality. It was not 
possible to consider offending within the context of a rate of offending by population of the 
offenders’ nationality due to such low integrity. 




Figure 4: Polish nationality. ND = No Data. Colour White = MAD factor < -1. 
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Request 2: 2012-2013 data – main results 
Data was sought from all English Police Forces (n = 39) on the counts of persons charged 
with criminal offences during calendar years 2012 and 2013 itemised by EU nationality. 
Thirty-six Police Forces responded positively (Derbyshire, Humberside and Norfolk declined 
to disclose information). Data received was analysed spatially, with polygons of Police Force 
boundaries forming the spatial units. MAD factor analysis identified six nationalities of 
interest: Latvia, Lithuanian, Polish, Romanian and Portuguese (the same as 2011 data), 
however it also identified Eire as of interest (as opposed to Italian in 2011). 
An intuitive analytical model providing a valuable method of spatial diversity visualisation 
remained one imperative of the research. Choropleth mapping is perhaps the most common 
method of visualisation readily accepted and utilised across disciplines and professional 
practice but potentially problematic in portraying correct significance of colour change. 
Classification of numerical categories can at times be misleading if not suitably applied and 
possibly confusing if application is bound to significance through a non intuitive statistical 
method. Seeking to resolve this issue Location Quotients (LQs) and Standardised Location 
Quotients (SLQs) were applied to further spatial analysis (see appendix 2 for description of 
test), a method with acknowledged value but emanating from economic and development 
disciplines rather than analysis of crime where it has received very little consideration. In 
addition Gini coefficients and Lorenze Curves were utilised and provided further 
corroboration of the LQs as a valuable method for identifying areal unit significance of 
offending counts in the wider national context. 
 SLQ’s were established for each accepted offending distribution and the Police Force areas 
attracting significant high scoring outliers were identified [145]. Of the 11 SLQ arrays, 
Cambridge Police area features in seven and is the most commonly seen area. Eire attracted 
no significant outliers. 
With the caveat of London aggregation, of the six nationalities examined varying levels of 
spatial diversity of offending were inferred by the volume of Police Force areas with 
significant SLQ’s for each. In 2012, Polish offending (SLQ unavailable for 2013) attracted  
nine outlier Police Force areas, Romanian four, Portuguese three, Latvian two and 
Lithuanian one. In 2013, the diversity increases most notably for Latvian offending attracting 
outliers in three coterminous Police Force areas on the East coast (limited to 
Cambridgeshire Police Force only in 2012). 
The main findings of this analysis were:  
 Polish offending displayed the highest MAD factor values, the lowest Gini coefficient 
of inequality and the highest number of Police Force areas with significant SLQ 
scores in 2012. Top quartile Police Force areas corroborate significant SLQ identities 
with the exception of Sussex Police force. 
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 Romanian offending closely followed Polish offending in volume and MAD factor 
values, but inequality of density increased and significant SLQ scores were apparent 
in four Police force areas in 2012 and five in 2013. For the Romanian sample, 
Cheshire and Thames Valley Police force areas were added to the 2013 top quartile 
whilst Suffolk Police moved to Q3 and Cambridge to Q2. SLQ’s for both Cambridge 
and Suffolk forces remained insignificant. 
 Lithuanian and Latvian offending appears the most spatially focused of all intra-EU 
offending by nationality with significant SLQ’s limited to Cambridge and the East 
Coast but top quartile Police Force areas expanding to surrounding areas. 
 
Spatial diversity was visualised using choropleth mapping, displaying significant SLQ’s (see 
figure 5). Polish offending displays considerable spatial diversity but clusters towards the 
east and southern coasts. Cumbria (far North West) is within Q3, an area reported 
previously as a Polish outlier of statistical significance in 2011 [146]. 
Spatial examination of intra-EU offending across a three year time span utilising differing 
spatial analytical methods provides useful and relevant information on the spatial diversity 
or non-diversity of these offending groups [147]. Of the spatial analysis methods explored it 
was the opinion of the research team that the use of SLQs, Gini coefficients and Lorenz 
curves provides a more intuitive and visual model of spatial diversity displayed by intra-EU 
migrant offenders which is readily accessible by practitioners and researchers alike. The SLQ 
also provides flexibility in the subjective decision making of denominator which was found 
useful following the analysis of request 1 data which had established the very poor integrity 
of population data by nationality, so limiting the creation of offending as a rate of 
nationality population. Spatial aspects of offending differ between nationalities; they should 
not be spatially generalised, highlighting that the exploration of crime (and potentially the 
investigation and justice resource provision within country) by nationality requires spatial 
context knowledge to generate informed understanding [148]. 
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Figure 5: Lorenz curve 
quartiles and significant SLQs 
for a number of foreign 
nationalities  
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Request 3: 2012 age, crime and gender data – preliminary results 
Data was sought from all English Police Forces (n = 39) on the number of foreign nationals 
charged with an offence, the offence charged, the age and gender of the offender for each 
of the following nationalities: Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Czech, 
Italian, Irish and Slovakian; for the calendar year 2012. Seven forces were unable to provide 
data, and a further five forces provided data but it was not in-keeping with the format of the 
analysis and therefore not used (e.g. male and female merged, no age specification, crime 
types not stipulated).     
Within this research the data collected concerned the charging of individuals for criminal 
offending as previously described. In the UK charging an offender under the age of 18 years 
is dependent upon the circumstances and history of the crime and the individual, as 
alternative methods of entering the justice system and resolving the criminal issue will 
always be considered first. For instance, a 17 year old who has not previously offended and 
commits an offence not considered to be so serious that formal and quick entry in to the 
justice system is required may be summonsed to appear at court (an administrative process) 
as opposed to being charged by Police and taken before a court. Consequently it must be 
noted that the results of the research reported are biased towards age ranges greater than 
18, those under 18 reflecting serious aspects of the offending or serious social issues with 
the younger offender; which may range from serious previous criminal history to more 
social care issues such as inability to formally identify, or significant concerns regarding 
parental ability or responses to a more informal entry to the criminal justice system. The 
research outcomes still provide useful age attribute information but do not seek to formally 
compare with the well-established ‘age crime profile’ discussed within the literature 
described. Table 3 provides a breakdown of the offending age profiles by aggregation of age 
categories. Whilst informative and indicative of potential differences aggregation loses 
detail and consequentially statistical testing was undertaken to seek confirmation. 
 
Table 3: Average ages of offenders by nationality for the year 2011-2012.  
Age Class 
2011-12 
England CZ IE IT LV LT PL PT RO SK 
0 -9 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
10 - 17 12% 11% 6% 1% 2% 2% 3% 7% 5% 13% 
18 - 24 32% 35% 18% 9% 29% 33% 18% 19% 41% 31% 
25 - 34 28% 32% 30% 29% 46% 42% 49% 32% 37% 33% 
35 - 44 17% 15% 22% 35% 17% 16% 21% 28% 13% 13% 
45 - 54 8% 7% 15% 12% 6% 5% 8% 11% 3% 7% 
55+ 3% 1% 9% 13% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 3% 
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Age crime profiles for each nationality were compared with that of the UK aggregated 
offending population and between each nationality. Using a Fishers Exact routine the 
hypothesis that the median values of each profile (nationality, male and female combined) 
differed from the median values of the profile compared against was established. Testing 
the null hypothesis that no difference between median values existed resulted in 
establishing significant divergence from the UK aggregated offending population profile in 
many cases and also inter nationality divergence. Table 4 displays Fishers Exact test results 
for age profiles of nationalities (male and female combined) with corresponding p values 
reflecting a two tailed test. 
Fishers Exact test is carried out within research to determine whether there are any non-
random associations between two categorical variables; calculating the exact probability 
value of the relationship. This calculates the difference between the data observed and the 
data expected and is achieved through combining the two data sets where the values in 
each table are analysed to see which are greater than or less than the median, presenting a 
2x2 contingency table [204]. This test is to further establish whether relationships within 
data are not random and the test therefore considers the data and decides whether the 
difference between variables is significant enough that it could not have arisen by chance. A 
p value is provided which if 0.05 or less reaches statistical significance. 
 
Table 4: Fishers Exact test results for age profile comparison 
  England CZ IE IT LV LT PL PT RO SK 
England   p=0.962 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.5407 
CZ p=0.962   p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.604 p=0.6546 
IE p<0.01 p<0.01   p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.4205 p<0.01 p<0.01 
IT p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01   p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
LV p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01   p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
LT p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01   p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
PL p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01   p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
PT p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.4205 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01   p<0.01 p<0.01 
RO p<0.01 p=0.604 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01   p=0.172 
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Overall it was found that  
 Significant disparity of the age profile of offending is apparent between nationalities 
 All foreign nationalities (the 9 nationalities data was obtained for) maintained their 
age profiles for each year (2011, 2012) and for the combined 2 year period.  
 Czech and Romania have the same age crime profile. The Czech profile is also the 
same as the UK. 
 Ireland and Slovakia have individual age profiles however the majority of offending 
stays in wider central age classes (18 – 45). 
 Italy has the most divergent age crime profile as a large section of crime is in 55+ age 
brackets. It has the oldest mean age of offenders.  
 
 
Figure 6: Mean age of offenders, separated by gender. The UK has been utilised as the aggregate 
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Figure 6 illustrates that Italian nationals charged with offences are the oldest, and that 
Italian females are older than Italian males (+5 years). Romanians are amongst the 
youngest, and Romanian males were found to be younger than females (the opposite is true 
for most other nationalities). Males were charged with offences a significant larger number 
of times, compared with females (often two to three times more offences). Polish male 
nationals were charged with almost 6,000 offences, followed by Lithuanian males (4,000) 
and Romanian males (3,500). Highest females charged with offences were Romanian (1,000) 
and Polish (500).  
Breaking down the offending data further by gender, table 5 illustrates a breakdown of 
offending by aggregated age categories suggesting differences between the aggregated 
England profile and individual nationalities and suitably accentuates the high age bracket of 
both Italian and Portuguese offending. The trend of small proportions of offending by 
youths between the ages of 10 and 17 except for those of Czech or Slovakian nationality is 
also apparent, although both appear comparative with the general English profile. 
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Table 5: Age crime profiles of offenders by nationality for the year 2011-2012 
 
2011 2011-12 
% England CZ IE IT LV LT PL PT RO SK 
Age  M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
0 -9 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
10 - 17 13% 9% 11% 10% 5% 7% 1% 2% 1% 4% 2% 3% 2% 8% 7% 4% 5% 7% 14% 10% 
18 - 24 31% 39% 35% 32% 19% 12% 8% 13% 29% 28% 34% 27% 17% 19% 20% 31% 40% 43% 31% 29% 
25 - 34 28% 25% 31% 36% 28% 39% 28% 33% 47% 38% 42% 44% 49% 43% 33% 31% 38% 31% 33% 37% 
35 - 44 17% 17% 15% 13% 23% 21% 36% 29% 17% 16% 16% 17% 22% 21% 25% 39% 13% 14% 13% 14% 
45 - 54 8% 8% 6% 8% 15% 12% 12% 13% 5% 12% 5% 8% 8% 9% 13% 7% 2% 4% 7% 5% 
55+ 3% 2% 1% 1% 9% 9% 14% 10% 1% 3% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3% 1% 1% 3% 3% 
 
 
Following the methodology within table 4, Fishers Exact test routines identified statistically significant differences between national offending 
age profiles and results are displayed in table 6. 
With the hypothesis that median values of each profile (nationality, gender) differed from the median values of the profile compared against 
here it can be seen that inter-nationality divergence exists when the profiles are delineated to gender. Figure 7 provides counts of instances 
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Table 6: Fishers Exact test results for nationality, age and gender 
 
UK M UK F CZ M CZ F IE M IE F IT M IT F LV M LV F LT M LT F PL M PL F PT M PT F RO M RO F SK M SK F 
UK M 
 
p<0.01 p=0.54 p=0.69 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.78 p=0.14 
UK F p<0.01 
 
p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.46 p<0.01 p<0.01 
CZ M p=0.54 p<0.05 
 
p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.19 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.28 p<0.05 p=0.84 p=0.1 
CZ F p=0.69 p<0.01 p<0.01 
 
p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.2 p=0.5 p=0.06 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.18 p<0.01 p=0.55 p=0.4 
IE M p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
 
p<0.05 p<0.01 p=0.16 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 p=0.11 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
IE F p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 
 
p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.83 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
IT M p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
 
p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.62 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
IT F p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.16 p<0.01 p<0.01 
 
p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 p<0.01 p=0.17 p=0.62 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
LV M p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
 
p=0.77 p<0.01 p=0.22 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.13 
LV F p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.19 p=0.2 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.77 
 
p<0.05 p=0.56 p<0.01 p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.14 
LT M p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.5 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 
 
p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 p=0.55 
LT F p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.06 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.22 p=0.56 p<0.01 
 
p<0.01 p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 
PL M p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
 
p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
PL F p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.05 p<0.01 
 
p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 
PT M p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 p=0.83 p<0.01 p=0.17 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
 
p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
PT F p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.11 p<0.01 p=0.62 p=0.62 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
 
p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
RO M p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.28 p=0.18 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
 
p<0.01 p=0.1748 p<0.01 
RO F p<0.01 p=0.46 p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
 
p<0.01 p<0.01 
SK M p=0.78 p<0.01 p=0.84 p=0.55 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.1748 p<0.01 
 
p=0.13 
SK F p=0.14 p<0.01 p=0.1 p=0.4 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.13 p=0.14 p=0.55 p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.13 
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Figure 7: Counts of non-significant differences per nationality 
 
Data for age and gender identified: 
 There are significant differences in the peak ages of offending between nationalities 
and also against the inclusive population English profile, including within a 
breakdown by gender. 
 Results indicate agreement with contemporary literature but provide valuable detail. 
 Age crime profiles for both male and females are maintained within the, Latvian, 
Polish, Romanian and Lithuanian nationals. 
 Czech and Slovakian nationalities display the lowest volume of significant inter-
nationality profile differences  
The FOI requests submitted also requested the offence type in order to explore any 
relativity between intra EU migration and crime types within England. A fourth FOIA request 
was submitted to all English Police Forces requesting information on the number of all 
nationalities in England charged with an offence, the offence charged and the age and 
gender of the offender. The data sought spanned a three month timescale; January to 
March, 2011. Any Welsh forces were removed from foreign national data in order to create 
an English model for analysis and as with the age profiles discussed previously, seven forces 
were unable to provide data, and a further five provided data that was not in-keeping with 
the format of the analysis and could therefore not be used. Some of the results received 
were already aggregated into groups, which were generally aligned with Home Office crime 
categories. Results which detailed individual offences were aggregated into the same 
























Nationality and Gender 
Age/offending profiles: Volume of non-significant differences between 
nationalities 
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Criminal Damage, Fraud, Robbery, and Other. A breakdown of crime types included in each 
category can be found in table 7.  
Figure 8 displays crime type profiles for individual foreign nationals and England by 
percentage of all offending in order to provide a comparative overview of the variance in 
the volume of types of crime being committed. Data displayed identifies ‘All Violence’ to be 
the prominent crime type in England where an offender is identified and formally enters the 
criminal justice system, followed by ‘Acquisitive’. Data from the other nationalities 
examined display profiles of a converse nature but with significant disparity apparent. 
Noteworthy aspects of the foreign national crime type profiles include the strong difference 
between ‘Acquisitive’ and ‘All Violence’ for Romania raising questions as to the reasoning 
behind the large disparities between the crime types and this variance from other foreign 
nationals. Preliminary results uncover that foreign nationals appear to be grouped in pairs 
with Lithuania and Latvia, Romania and Czech Republic, Ireland and Poland sharing similar 
crime type profiles. 
Building on Hirschi and Gottfredson’s (1984) assertion that “person-crimes peak later than 
property crimes and the rate declines with age” [116], questions can be raised as to whether 
links may be made between Romania’s younger age crime profile (see Table 3) and the 
predominant acquisitive crime type profile found within Figure 8. Blumstein et al. (1988) 
uncovered links between age and crime types with research findings indicating distinct 
career paths for different crime types, implying differences may reflect the changing 
opportunity to commit different crime types at different ages [149]. 
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Table 7: Individual crime types in aggregated crime categories 
Acquisitive All Violence Sexual Offences Other Drugs 
Damage 
& Arson 
Fraud Robbery Burglary 
Other Theft Assault ABH Soliciting 




















Theft by employee 
Assault without 
injury 











Theft from machine 
or meter 








Theft from vehicle 
Kidnap/ Abduction 
of child 





Theft of vehicle Possess weapon rape of  child under 13 False imprisonment 
Proceeds of crime Harassment sexual assault Affray 
Make off without 
payment 
Threats to Murder 
sexual assault  under 
13 
Begging 
Handle stolen goods 
Cause fear of 
violence 




Attempted theft Attempted Murder assault  by penetration 
Offences relating 
to notification 
Abstract electricity Murder 






sexual activity in 
presence of child 
 
Administer Poison Prohibited image child 
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Figure 8: The percentage of individual crime types by total crime recorded for each nationality. 
 
Comparing the crime type proportions data in Table 8 confirms England has a differing crime 
type profile compared to all foreign nationals (as shown within the table). ‘All Violence’ is 
the highest crime type whilst ‘Acquisitive’ is the peak crime type for every other nationality 
including Italy which has been included in this comparison. This data suggests Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland not only share the highest crime type, but also the top two 
crime type proportions; ‘Acquisitive’, and ‘All Violence’ respectively. However Ireland, Italy 
and Poland show stronger similarities, with a shared percentage variance of 6% between 
these categories. This variance is also smaller than the other foreign nationals but is shared 
by the UK albeit with the reverse crime types. Although Romania and Czech Republic share 
‘Total Theft’ as their peak crime types their second peak relies on ‘Other’ crime rather than 
‘All Violence’ showing disparities between the nationalities lower crime types. The category 
of ‘Other’ captures offences such as alcohol related offences connected with driving, a 
category discussed in the literature as being particularly noticeable in CEE nationalities and 
may explain this apparent peak in crime types [114, 123-125]. An argument for a link 
between age and crime type could begin to emerge as Romania and Czech Republic share 
the lowest age-crime bracket alongside less violent crime than any other nationality, 
suggesting relevant questions for future research in order to understand the patterns and 
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Table 8: Crime type profiles of offenders by nationality for the year 2011-2012 
% 2011 2011-12  
Crime  Type  England IE LV LT PL RO CZ IT 
Acquisitive 23% 33% 51% 47% 35% 66% 49% 30% 
All Violence 30% 27% 20% 19% 29% 3% 10% 24% 
Sexual Offences 2% 3% 1% 1% 2% 1% 3% 3% 
Burglary   6% 7% 3% 3% 4% 6% 6% 2% 
Drug offences 13% 5% 2% 2% 5% 0% 4% 10% 
Criminal damage 8% 5% 4% 4% 6% 0% 3% 6% 
Fraud & forgery 3% 3% 3% 4% 1% 6% 2% 6% 
Robbery 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 1% 
Other  12% 15% 15% 18% 16% 16% 21% 19% 
 
 
England shares Romania’s lower peak age bracket (see figure 6) and presents contrasting 
crime type results. This led the research to explore the validity of the FOIA data being used 
and its comparability when analysing crime types. The 2011 FOI requests for the types of 
crime committed by the nationality inclusive ‘England’ offending population sought data for 
a sample three month period (January to March 2011) only as a result of resource and cost 
restrictions. Such a time restricted sample is therefore open to any seasonal crime type 
changes and may not be suitably comparative but sufficient to indicate potential questions.  
Open access statistical crime data was obtained from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
in the UK for 2011 detailing counts of crime reported and recorded, but not necessarily 
detected, by Police forces where all recording of crime follows comprehensive recording 
rules as used by the UK Government Home Office.  
Figure 9 portrays an apparently more comparable crime type profile than the 2011 FOIA 
data presented within figure 8, sharing the same peak as the foreign nationalities with lower 
levels of violent rather than acquisitive crime. However, it is important to recognise that the 
ONS data is an annual population sample of all reported and recorded crime, whereas the 
FOIA data obtained covers the number of offenders charged with an offence.  Therefore, 
the ONS data cannot be used as a comparable data source against the foreign national FOIA 
data which is a measure of policing activity and the ability to detect crimes. The difference 
between the two data sets is significant with the FOIA for England producing higher levels of 
violent crime and the ONS data producing higher levels of acquisitive crime. The ONS data is 
still valuable to consider as it raises questions relating to why general offences of violence 
are better detected than acquisitive offences (shown in the higher levels of ‘All Violence’ in 
the FOIA data) in a non-Prüm signatory country in contrast to migrant nationalities.  
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Figure 9: Individual crime type proportions of total recorded crime for all nationalities (2011). 
 
 
Table 9 provides a breakdown of offence types aggregated into acquisitive or violent crime 
for the examined nationalities. Within this table categories have been adjusted accordingly 
to become inclusive of all violent or acquisitive crime with offences of robbery included in 
the Violence category as it is by nature a violently confrontational crime against the person.  
 
Table 9: Acquisitive vs. Violent crime type % comparison chart 
% 2011-12 2011 
Crime Type RO CZ LV LT PL IT IE UK 
Acquisitive 72% 55% 55% 51% 40% 31% 40% 29% 
Violent 4% 13% 21% 20% 30% 25% 36% 33% 
Difference 68% 42% 34% 31% 9% 6% 4% -4% 
 
 
Crime type profiles for each nationality were compared using a Chi Square test of 
independence based upon the hypothesis that the acquisitive and violent percentage scores 
by nationality are independent. The chi-square test of independence is used to test the null 








Acquisitve Violence Criminal 
damage 
Drug offences Fraud Other 
Total recorded crime UK (ONS)  
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that which could be expected and table 10 provides the results. Where p values are <0.05 
(95% confidence level) the alternative hypothesis that the observed proportions are 
independent and have not arisen by chance is accepted  
 
Table 10: Chi Square results for crime type (Acquisitive vs. Violent) profile comparisons 
 
CZ IE LV LT PL RO England IT 
CZ 
 
<0.001 0.3152 0.2917 <0.05 <0.05 <0.001 <0.05 
IE <0.001 
 
<0.05 <0.05 0.7034 <0.001 0.6077 0.8936 
LV 0.3152 <0.05 
 
0.9421 0.0794 <0.001 <0.05 0.0654 
LT 0.2917 <0.05 0.9421 
 
0.0996 <0.001 <0.05 0.0818 
PL <0.05 0.7034 0.0794 0.0996 
 
<0.001 0.3098 0.984 
RO <0.05 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 
<0.001 <0.001 
England <0.001 0.6077 <0.05 <0.05 0.3098 <0.001 
 
0.4551 
IT <0.05 0.8936 0.0654 0.0818 0.984 <0.001 0.4551 
  
 
Romania is the only nationality to display independence from all other nationalities 
examined and overall the crime type analysis raises a number of issues given that the data 
examined represents the ability of the English Police forces to identify offenders and bring 
them to justice through the formal offence charging route. The very significant low 
proportion of detected violent Romanian offending seeks explanation although it has been 
previously suggested that immigrants are more prone to under-reporting, due to distrust, 
cultural attitudes and language barriers [122, 114]. Whilst potentially mitigating the low 
Romanian proportions this is a contentious issue with Papadopoulous (2013) arguing that 
immigrants do not under-report more than natives through victimisation survey research 
[183]. 
In terms of the acquisition of forensic evidence violent crime with injury is seen as an 
activity more likely to yield bio-informatic (DNA) data than most non confrontational 
acquisitive offences. Further breakdown of violent offending through a sample of Police 
Forces experiencing significantly high Standardised Location Quotients of offending is 
provided in Figure 10 with comparisons between Latvian, Polish and Romanian offending, 
the offence types of Murder (and attempt) with Wounding/Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH) and 
Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) being those most likely to yield forensic trace evidence. Here it 
can be seen that Romanian offending involves a notably smaller proportion of such serious 
injury violence than both Latvian and Polish offending. 
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Figure 10: Data breakdown of violent offending by nationality in England.  
 
Lincolnshire (2011) Police Only 
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Calling on only English offending data an analytical model was developed incorporating 
spatiality, age, gender and type of criminal activity pertinent to offending by inter-EU 
migrants. The model identified that overall, and as in part suggested by the limited available 
previous research findings, offending activity delineated by nationality should not be 
generalised or linked to known national profiles as a default position. 
 
Spatial aspects: 
Within England offending by nationality grouping displayed significant spatial diversity 
ranging from focus on areal units (Latvian and Lithuanian offending limited to East Coast 
areas) to significant diversity at the meso scale (Polish with very limited areal unit focus). 
Spatial analysis reveals potential impact on the justice and social systems at a localised level 
where some areas are seen to experience significantly higher rates of offending than others 
at levels likely to require greater resource provision for victims, offenders and the general 
population. From the Prüm perspective it can be seen as identifying that spatial knowledge 
of offending by areal units may serve to identify areas/areas of responsibility that may 
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Age-gender profiles 
Within England data confirmed that generalising the age crime profile of national offending 
groups is contrary to the quantitative results reported. There are significant differences 
between the age-gender offending profiles of offenders within and between national groups 
which may be linked to the age profile of migration but, with further research, may also 
inform the knowledge base on criminal careers of inter-EU migrant offenders and again be 
indicative of the potential impact of the Prüm directive. Romanian offending displayed a 
lower age profile than other nationalities and high volumes of acquisitive crime, potentially 
suggesting through previously published works that offenders from that group may be at 
early stages of criminal career development. In contrast Latvian and Lithuanian offenders 
have a higher peak offending age together with significantly higher volumes of violent crime 
questioning whether those offending populations in England have greater developed 




Similarly the crime type profiles of nationalities appear to differ and should not be 
generalised. The vast majority of offending was found to be relatively low level acquisitive 
crime such as theft and particularly theft from shops. Most notable was the very low 
proportion of violent crime committed by Romanians which may be indicative of low 
reporting levels within the Romanian community and could with further research raise a 
number of important questions such as reporting/knowledge of issues of domestic related 
violence and abuse. 
Relating back to Prüm the analytical model has the potential to provide core context 
provision on its application and development, particularly through the identification of areas 
and methods that could be further investigated to establish a detailed investigation of 
quantitative evaluation of impact. It also strongly suggests that preventative methods and 
particularly information to be provided in order to impact deterrence needs to be tailored 
to national groupings as opposed to a generalised ‘all inclusive’ approach.  
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The EU 
In parallel to the development of an analytical model to inform context provision work was 
undertaken to establish the transferability of such a model to partner member states; 
seeking knowledge on data availability, integrity, relevance and usefulness. EU member 
states are complex in structure, geography and political history (including regulation of 
migration) (see table 11 for some demographic data). For each of these member states a 
number of key data sets were identified and explored to identify the smallest geographic 
scale at which analysis of crime rates could be calculated and provide suitable areal units for 
analysis and presentation.  
Data was collected on population, nationality of foreigners in the population, counts of 
crime, counts of foreign offenders detected/charged/convicted, and where possible the 
nationality of these foreign offenders for a number of EU member states. It was found that 
crime data is not easily accessible for many EU member states (19 out of 28 member states 
could not provide data relating to foreign and native offender at a geographic scale lower 
than country level) [150]. 
In order to provide some comparability, Eurostat NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units 
for Statistics) classification system was utilised [151]. NUTS classifications were introduced 
as a single, coherent system for dividing up the expansive EU territory to harmonise 
collection, transmission and publication of statistics. In order to be comparable, the 
geographical areas relating to the statistics need to be similar in terms of population and 
according to Eurostat classifications ought to cover the following population thresholds:  
- NUTS 1: 3 – 7 million people 
- NUTS 2: 800,000 – 3 million people 
- NUTS 3: 150,000 – 300,000 people.  
However, despite the aim of ensuring regions of comparable size, each NUTS level still 
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Table 11: Demographic data of the EU28 member states, including size, population and crime rate. 
Country 





Number of  
offences (2012) 
Crime rate 
(per 10,000 pop) 
EU15     
Austria (Statistik Austria) 83,900 8,401,940 548,027 652 
Belgium (Statbel) 30,500 11,099,554 1,035,836 933 
Denmark (Danmarks Statistiks) 42,900 5,227,012 154,494 296 
Finland (Statistics Finland) 338,400 5,426,674 425,421 784 
France (INSEE) 454,000 62,765,235 3,327,853 530 
Germany (DESTASIS & BKA) 357,000 80,523,746 5,997,040 745 
Greece (EL.STAT) 131,900 10,816,286 194,244 180 
Ireland (CSO) 84,400 4,453,276 245,425 551 
Italy (ISTAT) 301,338 59,685,227 933,895 156 
Luxembourg (STATEC) 2,600 537,039 37,639 701 
Netherlands (CBS) 41,500 16,856,620 1,140,430 677 
Portugal (INE) 92,200 10,427,301 404,813 388 
Spain (INE) 504,600 46,591,857 275,130 59 
Sweden (SCB) 450,000 9,555,893 1,402,588 1,468 
     
A10     






Czech Republic (CZSO) 78,900 10,513,209 304,528 290 
Estonia (Statistics Estonia) 45,200 1,325,217 40,816 308 
Hungary (KSH) 93,000 9,908,798 472,015 476 
Latvia (CSB) 64,600 2,044,813 49,905 244 
Lithuania (LSD) 65,300 1,989,268 42,884 216 
Malta (NSO) 316 421,364 15,622 371 
Poland (GUS) 312,700 38,495,659 1,119,803 291 
Slovakia (SU 49,000 5,415,949 47,561 88 
Slovenia (SU) 20,7000 2,055,496 16,025 78 
     
A2     
Bulgaria (National Statistical 
Institute) 
111,000 7,284,552 40,400 55 




     
Croatia (DZS) 56,600 4,284,889 110,068 257 
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Analysis of the data pertaining to the calendar year 2012 identified limited availability of 
data cross the EU member states relating to offending by foreign nationals at a number of 
different geographic scales. Appendix 4 provides a detailed breakdown of the level of data 
availability for each EU member state providing geographic as well as demographic detail. 
Over all it was found that data could only be obtained at the following levels: 
At the macro scale (country level):  
- 17 out of 28 EU member states published data on foreign offending (e.g. a 
division of foreign and native offenders) 
o Only 11 were able to provide a breakdown of nationality of offenders.  
At the meso (in-country) scale: 
- 8 out of 28 EU member states published data on foreign offending  
o 3 at NUTS 2 level 
o 5 at NUTS 3 level 
- Only 3 were able to provide a breakdown data of nationality of offenders.  
Overall, data availability from EU15 member states was considered to be relatively poor. 
Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg were not studied in detail due to lack of data availability 
(Greece and Ireland) or the small geographic nature of the member state (Luxembourg) 
which provides data only at a single administrative (country) level. Similarly, Cyprus and 
Malta were also omitted from analysis due to their small size. It is well documented that 
southern European countries (e.g. Malta and the islands of Italy) have a much more pressing 
migration problem from third country nationals (e.g. African nationals) compared to EU 
nationals. Therefore, it is expected that their intra-EU offending data would have limited 
impact on the overall EU picture.  
 
Spatial Clustering 
In order to begin to analyse the geographic diversity of foreign offenders, Location Quotient 
mapping of EU offending identified France and its bordering nations (Spain, Italy, Germany, 
and Switzerland) as a significant cluster of countries for which meso level data was available 
and illustrated interesting trends worth exploring further; an apparent clustering of foreign 
offending in border regions (see figure 11). Table 12 illustrates the relevant LQ values 
identified in regions that border with another member state.   
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Table 12: LQs analysis of select EU member states which identify increased border activity.   




LQ > 1.7 
Pyrénées-Atlantiques  
Haute Garone 
LQ > 1.1 
Savoie  
Alpes-Maritimes 
Italy LQ > 1.7 





País Vasco  
La Rioja 




Valle d’Aosta  
Lombardia 
France/Switzerland LQ > 1.1 
Trentino Alto Adige 
Veneto  
Fruili Venezia Giulia 
Austria/Slovenia LQ > 1.1 
Germany 
Oberbayern Austria LQ > 1.4 
Freiburg 
Karlsruhe 
France LQ > 1.1 
Trier Luxembourg LQ > 1.4 
Trier  
Köln 
Belgium LQ > 1.1 
Düsseldorf Netherlands LQ > 1.1 
 
 
In figure 11, France demonstrates increased border activities with Spain and Italy, regions 
which are major tourist regions and contain commercial routes to neighbouring countries. 
The departments of Pas de Calais and Paris display high LQ values (> 1.7) for foreign 
offenders, Nord-Pas de Calais has low LQ values for foreign population but high values for 
foreign offenders in relation to the surrounding departments. Savoie, Paris and Pyrénées-
Orientales are also over-represented (LQ>1.4) for crime rate in the population.  
Aokia and Todo (2009) looked at the relationship between migration and crime in France, 
finding conflicting results [103]. Initially, it appears that crime rates are positively correlated 
with the share of immigrants in the population (significant to 0.05); however, if controlled 
for economic circumstances this correlation becomes insignificant, “immigrants are not 
‘inherently’ more likely to commit crimes than the rest of the population” [103]. The data 
obtained for this research indicates that departments that are high for foreign population 
also have some overlap with areas that illustrate high crime rates (Haute-Savoie, Alpes 
Maritimes, Paris and surrounding areas).  




Figure 11: Location quotients for foreign offending in (from clockwise) Germany, Switzerland, Italy, 
Spain and France, illustrating border clustering.   
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In Spain bordering regions with France equally illustrate high LQs for foreign offending. It 
was not possible to determine the nationality of the foreign offenders within those regions 
(whether these are French nationals committing crime in Spain or other foreign nationals) 
as this data was not available. The Ministry of Interior [152] does indicate that French 
nationals are the fourth largest EU nationality arrested in Spain (preceded by Romanians, 
Bulgarians and Portuguese). LQs for foreign and native offenders could only be calculated at 
regional leave (NUTS2), and did not indicate any significant results. Northern (Galicia, 
Asturias and Cantabria) and western regions (Extremadura and Andalucía) had high LQs for 
native offenders (LQ<1.4), and the region of Cataluña and Madrid had low LQs (LQ<0.9). The 
regions bordering with France to the north-west of Spain (Cataluña, Aragón, Navarra, País 
Vasco and La Rioja) indicated a slight over-representation of foreign offenders (LQ<1.4), 
however regions bordering with Portugal (Galicia and Extremadura) showed the opposite 
(LQ<0.6).  
Marcu (2012) estimated that the increased population from former socialist states living in 
Spain was mainly due to the huge arrival of Romanian immigrants, for whom Spain and Italy 
have been the main destinations [153]. At the start of 2008, the Romanian population 
represented 64% of all the groups coming from CEE and 13% of all the foreign groups living 
in Spain. Romanians also had the highest year-on-year growth rate for all foreign nationals 
originating from the former socialist bloc, followed by Bulgarian immigrants. 
Arbach-Lucioni et al. (2014) analysed the rate of crimes committed by Spanish and foreign 
nationals; assessing the socio-demographic, criminal history and imprisonment-related 
factors for 1,574 convicted males (657 foreigners, 917 natives). Foreign nationals were 
found to originate from 63 countries, most commonly Morocco (12.5%), Colombia (3.2%), 
Ecuador (3.0%), and Romania (2.3%) [154]. The authors found no differences in the rate of 
violent conviction, however differences in the distribution of risk factors in each nationality 
group were observed (foreigners were younger and had lower economic resources and 
lower social support) [154].  
Buonanno and Montolio (2008) studied the socio-economic and demographic determinants 
of property crimes in 46 out of 52 Spanish provinces between 1993 and 1999, considering 
amongst other factors the crime rate of foreign nationals [155]. They found that property 
crime and the total crime appear to be significantly correlated to the fraction of foreigners 
in the population. This was found to not be the case for crimes against the person. These 
results suggest that provinces with a higher fraction of immigrants suffer more criminal 
activities of a specific nature. However, this may be due to the fact that the opportunity cost 
of crime for a foreigner is lower than for natives because they are normally paid much lower 
wages or have temporary (or illegal) jobs [155]. 
This idea was also considered by Westbrook (2013) who analysed the level of immigration 
and crime between 2003 and 2007 in Catalonia [109]. She found that the majority of 
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immigrants were male, between 18-35 years old (which criminologists claim have the 
highest incidence of criminal delinquency), with relatively volatile economic situations (high 
unemployment, lower wages, etc.). For each year examined, she found a higher crime rate 
for all immigrant populations in Catalonia as compared to that of natives [109]. A 
statistically significant positive correlation between migration and crime for three (out of 
37) nationalities was found indicating that “certain immigrant groups are more strongly 
correlated with higher crime rates than others”, even after their age, gender and GDP 
demographic differences were controlled for [109]. 
At the end of 2012, the Ministry of Interior (2013) found that the number of Romanian 
nationals in Spanish prisons represented 10.2% of the total number of foreigners detained 
and the highest percentage of citizens from any EU member state (46.9% of the total) [152]. 
According to Ilie (2014), Moroccans (26.4%), Colombians (11%) and Romanians (10.2%) 
make up the majority of total foreign prisoners detained in Spanish prisons for all 
nationalities [156].  
 
In Italy, high LQs for foreign offending were found in the north (LQ>1.1) and low LQ values 
were found in the south (LQ<0.6). LQs for foreign population illustrate some clustering 
around the centre of Italy. The Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) [157] indicates 
that these regions are consistently high for: Romanian, Polish, Bulgarian, German, French 
and British nationals. Location quotients for crime rates by foreign offenders could only be 
carried out at the regional level (NUTS2). Foreign offenders were slightly under-represented 
in the south of Italy but slightly over-represented in the north. The highest region of over-
representation is the region containing Milan in the north (LQ>1.4). Sardinia and Sicily are 
significantly under-represented (LQ<0.6).  
Immigrant crime is a relatively recent phenomenon in Italy, since historically it was 
predominantly an emigration rather than immigrant nation, and can be regarded primarily 
as an exporter of criminality. Italian criminologists are divided on the question of whether 
foreigners are particularly likely to be offenders [158]. It is undeniable that foreigners are 
more represented in the official statistics but it also true that they are more easily 
recognizable and that they tend to commit more conventional crimes, which are, in turn, 
easier to detect.  
ISTAT indicates that foreigners were responsible for 32% of all crimes in Italy in 2011, and 
are especially active in theft and burglaries [157]. Becucci and Massari (2003) found that 
more than 60% of all reported offenders were foreign in the metropolitan areas of the 
central and northern regions (around Turin, Milan, Bologna and Florence) [159].  
Bianchi et al. (2012), using police administrative data, empirically examined the relationship 
between crime and immigration across Italian provinces from 1990 to 2003 [104].The 
authors found a positive correlation between the size of an immigrant population and the 
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incidence of property crimes and the overall crime rate. However, the relationship 
disappears when immigration is properly instrumented, except for a significant effect on 
robberies. The effect on the overall crime rate is negligible since robberies are only a small 
fraction (1.5 %) of total criminal offences. They conclude that “neither the overall crime rate 
nor the number of most types of criminal offence are significantly related to the size of the 
immigrant population”, but do raise questions concerning the perception of the crime-
migration concept [104]. 
 
In Germany, spatial clustering of foreign offenders is skewed towards the western and 
southern parts of the country, with low LQ values in the north-east. Evident from figure 11 is 
an apparent division between East and West Germany, with the west illustrating relative 
over-representation and the east relative under-representation. Considered from an EU 
perspective, bordering regions with traditional EU15 countries to the west display high LQs, 
but bordering regions with A8 member states to the east display the opposite. It is unclear 
of the reasons behind this at present and would require further quantitative data collection.   
Most people with a migration background come to Germany from Turkey (17.6%), followed 
by Poland (9.6%), Russia (7.5%) and Italy (4.9%); 1.4 million (Spät-) Aussiedler have come 
from the successor states of the former Soviet Union – especially from the Russian 
Federation (576,000) and Kazakhstan (553,000) [160]. Immigrants settle in major towns and 
cities such as Düsseldorf, Köln, Frankfurt and München (LQ>1.7). Municipalities such as 
Duisburg, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt and München also contain major transportation hubs 
(airports, seaports, harbours, railway networks) for commerce, industry and tourism and 
consequently attract a lot of people.  
Previous work looking at overall crime rates between East and West Germany found the 
East to have higher crime rates [161]. Jones (2008) states that it is “unclear […] if this 
difference relates to residents and visitors in the different regions or to political differences 
between areas” [161]. Entorf and Spengler (2008) found a steady upward trend in violent 
crimes (specifically attributed to robbery and assault rather than homicide and rape) in both 
East and West Germany [162]. Importantly, they provided that contrary to popular 
perception violent crime rates were not found to be higher in East Germany than in West 
Germany [162]. 
Piopiunik and Ruhose (2014) explored the “exogenous allocation of ethnic German 
immigrants across regions” of Germany and found a correlation between immigration and 
the overall crime rate [163]. They found the inflow of one ethnic German immigrant per 
1,000 inhabitants increased the total crime by 0.88%. Effects which were found to vary by 
crime type; immigration had a strong impact on burglary and property damage, but no 
effect on street crime [163]. These effects were also dependent on the socio-economic 
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conditions of the receiving region and the impact of ethnic German immigration crime was 
stronger in regions with a high pre-existing crime rate [163].  
 
Comparative offending data was not available in Belgium. Personal communication with 
colleagues indicated that it was difficult to obtain data on crime and criminality for 
researchers working outside of the organisations that collate and process these [164]. Even 
Belgian criminologists and researchers do not easily get access to this information. Police do 
not publish this information, nor make it accessible for researchers in its raw format. Table 
13 provides some information of the top ten registered nationalities (where this information 
is known) of suspects for given crime types in the form of a percentage [165]. It also 
provides the total number of crimes committed in 2012 by region. Although it was only 
possible to obtain data for a limited number of EU nationalities, it becomes evident that 
foreign offending does occur in Belgium and should be of concern to policy makers [165].   
 
Table 13: Crimes committed in Belgium for which the nationality of the suspect is known (top 9 
registered nationalities given in the form of a percentage for Belgium as a whole and for each of the 
three regions within Belgium). (Data courtesy of the Federal Police Belgium) 








 Total (numbers) 414,564 99,717 79,320 40,248 47,269 
1 Belgian 62.5% 83.1% 80.2% 66.2% 78.0% 
2 French 3.2% 3.2% 2.3% 4.2% 4.1% 
3 Dutch 2.3% 2.0% 1.6% 4.7% 3.4% 
4 Romanian 5.3% 0.5% 0.7% 3.4% 
 
5 Polish 2.0% 0.9% 0.9% 1.2% 0.6% 
6 Italian 1.3% 1.2% 1.5% 1.6% 0.9% 
7 Bulgarian 1.0% 









   
Brussels Capital Region 
 Total (numbers) 84,293 11,464 10,167 5,249 7,330 
1 Belgian 41.7% 60.4% 59.5% 50.2% 68.2% 
2 Romanian 8.9% 2.5% 2.6% 5.7% 
 
3 French 3.4% 8.2% 3.7% 5.4% 3.9% 







6 Bulgarian 1.5% 
    
7 Italian 1.7% 1.2% 1.5% 1.7% 0.9% 
8 Portuguese 
 




   
 [Page 71 of 103] 
  
Flanders 
 Total (numbers) 199,085 51,568 37,662 22,475 26,995 
1 Belgian 61.7% 84.6% 81.7% 68.1% 80.1% 
2 Dutch 3.9% 3.2% 2.8% 7.8% 5.2% 
3 Romanian 5.2% 0.4% 0.5% 3.2% 
 
4 French 1.8% 1.3% 0.8% 2.5% 3.2% 
5 British 
   
1.6% 
 
6 Polish 2.6% 1.2% 1.1% 1.6% 0.7% 














 Total (numbers) 131,186 36,685 31,491 12.524 12,944 
1 Belgian 70.6% 86.8% 84.3% 70.3% 79.2% 
2 French 5.9% 4.7% 4.1% 6.8% 6.2% 
3 Italian 2.5% 2.4% 2.9% 3.4% 1.8% 









6 Luxemburgish     0.5% 
7 Polish 














Overall foreigners make up approximately 11% of the population, with the Brussels Capital 
Region containing by far the highest percentage of foreigners (33%, Flanders – 7%, Wallonia 
– 10%). EU migrants make 67% of the foreign population, with Italy (14.5%), the 
Netherlands (12.3%) and France (13%) making up the largest proportion of foreigners in 
total.   
The foreign population tends to be over-represented in the border regions – predominantly 
along the border with the Netherlands and Germany. Antwerp, the second most populous 
city in Belgium contains one of the biggest ports in the world as well as a busy international 
airport. Statbel Belgium [166] indicates that approximately 60% of residents of Antwerp 
have a migrant background. The Flemish municipalities close to the Dutch border 
experience a lot of cross border commuting for work where Dutch people live in the border 
regions (e.g. Hoogstraten, Lanaken) but work in the Netherlands and consequently a 
significant percentage of foreigners living in these border regions are Dutch .  
Data available from Austria was only able to determine the number of foreigners convicted 
per region, which was not comparable to offending data analysed for all the other countries. 
The Netherlands also provided limited data relating to crime by foreign nationals. No meso 
scale data was available; however at country level Statistics Netherlands [167] identifies 
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German nationals as the second highest offending EU nationality (after Romanian). Again 
this provides evidence of foreign offending, but the distribution cannot be clarified.  
 
The Netherlands provided limited detailed data relating to crime by foreign nationals. 
Foreigners in the population seem to aggregate around major towns and cities in the 
Randstad conurbation – Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague, one of the most 
important economic and densely populated areas in the northwest of Europe (LQ>1.4). 
These four cities have received considerable attention due to a number of social and 
economic problems including rising unemployment and deprivation of certain urban 
environments. Statistics Netherlands (CBS) indicates that currently nearly 60% of 
immigrants settle in municipalities with a population over 100,000 (currently 27 large 
municipalities), and Amsterdam has the highest proportion of immigrants with a non-
western background [168].  
In 2012, four in ten immigrants to the Netherlands originated from another EU country with 
a large majority coming from Poland [169], and a rise from Southern European countries 
such as Spain and Italy (potentially due to the effect of the economic crisis in these 
countries) [167]. Immigration from CEE member states remained steady; however 
emigration of these groups rose. Emigration of Dutch nationals to Belgium and Germany 
remains steady; the Mediterranean and France was found to be popular with pensioners as 
destination countries of Dutch natives [170]. Most immigrants of Polish nationality come to 
the Netherlands to find work via agencies in construction and horticulture industries located 
in the Westland area and the province of Brabant and the tulip growing areas. Immigrants 
employed in short-term work are not required to register as residents; therefore these will 
not be recorded in official statistics. Statistics Netherlands also found that around half of 
Polish immigrants who come to the Netherlands leave within a ten year period [171].  
The highest crime rates by population were found in the municipalities of Amsterdam and 
Eindhoven (LQ>1.4). Police statistical data on crime rates found that Eindhoven has had the 
second highest crime rate (per 1,000 populations) in the Netherlands after Amsterdam for 
the past two years. Amsterdam also demonstrated twice the national average for registered 
thefts (87 per 1,000 residents), followed by Eindhoven (77/1,000 residents) and Maastricht 
(71/1,000 residents) [172].  
 
Data from the A8 member states was mixed. Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia did not break 
down their data into foreign or native population, nor did they supply data on foreign and 
native offenders. Therefore they are not included in this analysis section. Cyprus and Malta 
only collect data at a single administrative (country) level due to their small geographic size, 
and are also omitted from the analysis. None of the remaining countries – the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia or Slovenia – published data on foreign offending, and 
consequently the LQs for crime by population could be calculated. 
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In the Czech Republic, the largest group of foreign nationals were Ukraine, Slovak, 
Vietnamese, Russian, Polish and Germans [173]. EU nationals make up 36.8% of all 
foreigners in the Czech Republic; predominantly originating from Slovakia (19.7%), Poland 
(4.4%), Germany (3.9%), Bulgaria (1.9), Romania (1.3%) and the UK (1.2%) [173]. No data 
was available which indicated the breakdown of foreign offenders, and only LQs for crime 
by population could be calculated and indicate that the region of Prague and Ostrava-mesto 
have high values (LQ>1.7). Kamenický (2013) looked at the structure and intensity of crime 
at regional level in the Czech Republic [174]. They found above-average crime rates in most 
regional cities (where Prague and Ostrava at the highest crime levels) [174]. Broken down by 
crime type they found that thefts and economic crimes were high in Prague, and violent 
crime and burglaries were higher towards the north of the Czech Republic, in regions 
bordering with Germany and Poland [174].  
LQs for the foreign population in Estonia illustrated that the county of Ida-Viru is strongly 
over-represented (LQ>1.7) and the remainder of the country is under-represented for 
foreign populations. By ethnic origin, 72.5% of the population of Ida-Viru were Russians, 
19.2% Estonians, 2.3% Ukrainians, 2.3% Belarusians and 0.9% Finish [175]. This is 
dramatically different from the rest of Estonia, where most counties are over 69.2% ethnic 
Estonians. National statistics in Estonia do not provide nationality details of offenders, nor 
do they provide details of native and foreign offenders.  
LQs for foreign population in Hungary illustrate a diverse pattern. Budapest was found to 
highly over-represented for foreign population (LQ>1.7) and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 
significantly under-represented (LQ<0.3). According to the 2011 Census, 80% of the 
population of Budapest was Hungarian, 1.2% Roma, 1.2% German, 0.4% Romanian and 0.1% 
Polish [176]. Hungary has the unique geo-economic advantage of occupying the middle of 
Europe in the midst of the important axis of the Danube as well as the Baltic-Aegean axis. As 
an effect, crime syndicates have been found to use Hungary as a major transit ground for 
their pan-European operations and as a base for coordinating their cells in other regions. 
Traffickers move illicit cargo by road and rail routes easily, e.g. tobacco and women from the 
Ukraine are trafficked towards Austria, and illegal immigrants are transferred from, and 
weapons and drugs are being imported from Croatia and Serbia. The local criminal networks 
in Hungary and Budapest in particular are formed by former members of security forces and 
pre-existing black marketers who maintained contacts with the local authorities. This has led 
to a widespread corruption in the local security forces and the coexistence of former and 
present executives with links to members of organized crime. Crime by population 
illustrates that the regions of Budapest and Fejér in the centre of Hungary are significantly 
over represented (LQ>1.4). Twenty-five percent of all crimes recorded in Hungary occur in 
Budapest.  
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Data from the Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia mirrored that available from the A8 member 
states. None of these countries published data on foreign and native offending, and 
consequently on the LQCs for crime by population could be calculated. 
 LQs for foreign population in Romania illustrate a diverse pattern, which identified the 
regions of Bucharest, Iasi, Suceava and Vaslui as significantly over represented (LQ>1.7). 
Significant ethnic groups are Roma Gypsies, Hungarians, Jews, Turks, Chinese and Germans. 
Most counties in Romania were identified to be over 95% ethnic Romanians, except for 
Covasna, where 73.7% of the population is Hungarian, 22% Romanian, and 4.1% Roma 
[177].  
Researchers have mapped the crime rate in every county of Romania (per 100,000 
populations) and identified that the most dangerous counties are Hunedoara, Alba and Gorj 
[178]. Monalche et al. (2011) found that the regions more economically developed 
displayed a lower crime rate [178]. Romania did not break down offenders according to 
nationality, or native and foreign offenders. Consequently only maps of crime by population 
could be produced which identified the regions of Alba, Braila, Galati, Hunedoara, 
Mehedinti and Vrancea as significantly over-represented (LQ>1.4). Bucharest's crime rate is 
rather low in comparison to other European capital cities, with the number of total offenses 
declining by 7% between 2012 and 2013 [179]. Although violent crimes fell by 13% in 2013 
compared to 2012, there were 19 recorded murders. Petty crime is more common, 
particularly in the form of pick pocketing, which occurs mainly on the city's public transport 
network.  Theft was reduced by 13.6% in 2013 compared to 2012. Levels of crime are higher 
in the southern districts of the city, particularly in Ferentari, a socially disadvantaged area. 
LQs for foreign population in Bulgaria illustrate a diverse pattern. Haskovo and Montana 
have a high concentration of Turks, Bulgarians and Roma gypsies within their city limits. 
Bulgaria did not break down offenders according to nationality, or native and foreign 
offenders. Consequently only maps of crime by population could be produced which 
identified the regions of Blagoevgrad, Haskovo, Montana, Pleven, Sliven, Stara Zagora, 
Vratsa and Yambol as significantly over-represented (LQ>1.4) and the region of Sofia as 
significantly under-represented (LQ<0.3). Varna is known to be the main hub for Bulgarian 
organized crime. Some sectors of the economy, including gambling, corporate security, 
tourism, real estate, and professional sports, are believed to be controlled in part by 
business groups with links to Communist-era secret services or the military [180].  
Bulgarian organised crime groups are involved in a wide range of activities, including drug 
trafficking, cigarette smuggling, human trafficking, prostitution, illicit antiquities trafficking, 
extortion and the arms trade [181]. They appear to have connections with the Russian 
Mafia, Serbian Mafia, and the Italian Cosa Nostra. Bulgaria is a source and, to a lesser 
extent, a transit and destination country for women and children who are subjected to 
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trafficking in persons, specifically forced prostitution and men, women, and children 
subjected to conditions of forced labour. 
Brücker et al. (2009) identified a strong regional concentration of migrants in EU15 member 
states [33]. Migrants cluster in city regions, particularly capital city regions, on the French 
and Spanish Mediterranean coastal regions and EU15 central European regions. Jones 
(2008) looked at the geographic distribution of crime in Germany, and found that large, 
transitional urban areas (such as Berlin and Bremen) experienced higher crime rates [161]. 
According to the 2006 European labour Force Survey, Ile de France had the largest 
concentration of migrants in Europe (5.7%), followed by London (3%), Catalonia and Madrid 
(2.7%) [33]. The largest concentration of A8 migrants was identified to be Estonian migrants 
in southern Finland (approx. 40% of Estonian migrants lived here). Cross-border migration 
was found to be a strong influence at the German-French, French-Belgian, Austrian-German, 
and the Czech-Slovakian border, suggesting an influence in cross-border commuting 
between countries with a common language [33].   
Some spatial analysis of crime by foreign nationals could be carried out across EU member 
states, which identified border regions as zones of greater activity. However, this data was 
limited to the categorisations of ‘foreign’ or ‘native’ offenders and did not provide a 
breakdown of nationality at a meso level (regional). Consequently it was not possible to 
determine whether EU or non EU-nationals were found to be offending in border regions, 
and whether the border activity was being committed by other bordering nationalities or by 
individuals originating from further away (e.g. itinerant travelling groups).    
The finding of increased border activity relate to work carried out by other project partners 
who utilised the Prüm Treaty to develop a cartography of DNA hits between the 
Netherlands and the EU, establishing transnational spatial patterns of offending 
predominantly indicating high rates of activities in border regions [182]. This may provide 
important intelligence for regional police forces to focus resources on the collection of body 
fluids at crime scenes to improve potential Prüm hits.  
 
Foreign offending 
In order to begin to test the English model, information relating to nationality of foreign 
offending was collected. Openly published data for 2012 was only available for ten (out of 
28) EU member states – Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and Spain – relating to rates and nationality of foreign 
offenders (see table 14). Data for these countries was only available at the macro level, and 
consequently no spatial clustering of intra-regional crime patterns could be determined.  
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Table 14: Foreign offenders by nationality as percentage of total crime (2012) 
Foreign 
offenders 




Denmark Germany Italy Netherlands Poland Slovakia England 
AT     150 0.06% 97 0.02% 5,283 0.09% 275 0.01% 210 0.02% 2 0.00% 135 0.15% 49 0.00% 
BE 12 0.00% 9 0.00% 75 0.01% 1,853 0.03% 392 0.01% 3,060 0.28% 8 0.00% 14 0.02% 115 0.00% 
BG 263 0.04% 597 0.22% 660 0.12% 13,347 0.22% 4,281 0.14% 1,540 0.14% 108 0.01% 49 0.05% 469 0.01% 
HR 391 0.07% 87 0.00% 107 0.02% 7,067 0.12% 1,929 0.05% no data 10 0.00% 22 0.02% 27 0.00% 
CY 3 0.00% 0 0% no data 34 0.00% 8 0.00% no data no data 4 0.00% 266 0.01% 
CZ 208 0.04%     85 0.02% 4,550 0.08% 528 0.02% 440 0.04% 98 0.01% 987 1.06% 936 0.03% 
DK 4 0.00% 1 0%     867 0.01% 33 0.00% 80 0.01% 4 0.00% 12 0.01% 50 0.00% 
EE 9 0.00% 5 0.00% 96 0.02% 526 0.01% 60 0.00% no data 7 0.00% no data 182 0.01% 
FI 2 0.00% 0 0% 201 0.04% 261 0.00% 29 0.00% 60 0.01% 1 0.00% no data 53 0.00% 
FR 27 0.01% 29 0.01% 326 0.06% 7,566 0.13% 2,236 0.07% 1,600 0.15% 27 0.00% 40 0.04% 734 0.02% 
DE 815 0.15% 359 0.13% 1,874 0.35%     2,030 0.07% 4,920 0.45% 112 0.01% 113 0.12% 319 0.01% 
GR 21 0.00% 35 0.01% 148 0.03% 9,547 0.16% 278 0.01% no data 7 0.00% 16 0.02% 87 0.00% 
HU 624 0.11% 40 0.02% 328 0.06% 4,226 0.07% 566 0.02% 600 0.06% 11 0.00% 394 0.42% 421 0.01% 
IE 0 0.00% 7 0.00% 111 0.02% 438 0.01% 169 0.01% 260 0.02% 8 0.00% 9 0.01% 2,883 0.09% 
IT 98 0.02% 85 0.03% 482 0.09% 22,618 0.38%     1,100 0.10% 22 0.00% 97 0.10% 910 0.03% 
LV 25 0.01% 54 0.02% 458 0.09% 2,550 0.04% 242 0.01% no data 38 0.00% no data 2,243 0.07% 
LT 35 0.01% 86 0.03% 1,108 0.21% 4,451 0.07% 879 0.03% no data 190 0.02% 3 0.00% 4,924 0.15% 
LU 0 0 no data no data 554 0.01% 14 0.00% no data no data 2 0.00% 2 0.00% 
NL 55 0.01% 48 0.02% 639 0.12% 6,940 0.12% 292 0.01%     26 0.00% 34 0.04% 430 0.01% 
MT 0 0 no data no data 16 0.00% 27 0.00% no data no data no data 31 0.00% 
PO 399 0.07% 880 0.33% 3,918 0.73% 37,497 0.63% 3,300 0.10% 7,130 0.66%     284 0.31% 8,326 0.25% 
PT 22 0.00% 10 0.00% 84 0.02% 4,587 0.08% 190 0.01% 810 0.08% 4 0% 8 0.01% 1,540 0.05% 
RO 1,449 0.27% 560 0.21% 1,660 0.31% 32,414 0.54% 69,789 2.07% 4,330 0.40% 156 0.01% 155 0.17% 7,276 0.22% 
SI 114 0.02% 15 0.01% no data 932 0.02% 365 0.01% no data 5 0.00% 15 0.02% 106 0.00% 
SK 511 0.09% 6,875 2.55% no data 2,450 0.04% 407 0.01% no data 31 0.00%     822 0.02% 
ES 19 0.00% 21 0.01% 291 0.05% 3,870 0.07% 1,033 0.03% 780 0.07% 23 0.00% 17 0.02% 351 0.01% 
SE 5 0.00% 8 0.00% 1,018 0.19% 748 0.01% 51 0.00% 110 0.01% 25 0.00% 6 0.01% 119 0.00% 
GB 19 0.00% 65 0.02% 1,086 0.20% 4,305 0.07% 538 0.02% 1,760 0.16% 25 0.00% 20 0.02%     
TOTAL EU   0.94%   3.72%   2.75%   2.99%   2.70%   2.65%   0.09%   2.62%   0.99% 
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Foreign offending by EU nationals was found to be low in volume in the EU member states 
analysed; it makes up approximately 4% of total crime in the Czech Republic, approximately 
3% of total crime in Italy, Germany and Denmark, 2.5% in the Netherlands, 1.5% in Slovakia, 
and less than 1% in England, Austria and Poland [183-185]. The figures illustrate that the 
highest foreign offending according to EU nationality varied greatly between these nine 
countries.  
Top offending EU nationalities are: 
 in Austria: Romanian, German, Hungarian and Polish;  
 in Belgium: Romanian, French and Dutch; 
 in the Czech Republic: Slovakian, Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian;  
 in Demark: Polish, German and Polish;  
 in England: Polish, Romanian and Latvian; 
 in Germany: Polish, Romanian and Italian’ 
 in Italy: Romanian; Bulgarian and Polish;  
 in the Netherlands: Polish, German and Romanian;  
 in Poland: Lithuanian, Bulgarian, Czech, German, and Romanian; and  
 in Slovakia: Czech, Polish, Hungarian, Italian and Romanian.  
 
Data relating to the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain includes missing information for a 
number of EU28 nationalities and therefore we must consider these figures with care. 
However, this data is useful in order to illustrate general trends and consequently was 
included in the analysis. 
The top offending nationalities were identified for each member state, first as a percentage 
of total crime. This identified Romanian, Polish and German nationals to be within the top 
five offending nationalities in each EU member state analysed. Subsequent statistical 
analysis was carried out using the MAD factor, to identify the significant nationalities for 
each country (see table 15). 
Focusing on A8 and A2 accession countries, Romanian, Polish and Bulgarian offenders 
showed a high degree of dispersion across the EU, identified as a significant nationality by 
MAD factor analysis in over nine out of 10 possible countries. All remaining nationalities – 
Czech, Lithuanian, Hungarian, Croatian, Slovakian, Slovenian and Latvian – only illustrate 
significant MAD factor scores in less than two out of 10 possible countries. 
In terms of migrating population, MAD factor was also calculated for foreign population, and 
identified Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian population to be significant. This time however, 
the dispersal is slightly less apparent. Polish and Romanian also showed a high degree of 
dispersion across the EU, a significant MAD factor was calculated in over nine out of 10 
possible countries. Bulgarian and Croatian nationals were deemed significant nationalities in 
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approximately half of the 10 possible countries, and the remaining nationalities – 
Hungarian, Lithuanian, Slovakian and Czech nationals – illustrated a significant MAD factor 
score in less than two out of 10 possible countries.  
 
Table 15: Mad factor analysis of significant offending nationalities for nine EU member states (MAD 
> 2, 2012).  
Austria: MAD  England/UK: MAD  Netherlands: MAD 
Romanian 26.4  Polish 26.4  Polish 8.7 
German 36.1  Romanian 22.9  German 5.6 
Hungarian 26.2  Lithuanian 15.1  Romanian 4.8 
Polish 18.8  Irish 8.4  Belgian 3.1 
Slovakian 18.0  Latvian 6.3    
Croatian 16.3  Portuguese 3.9    
Bulgarian 8.3       
Czech 6.4       
Italian 4.7       
Slovenian 3.7       
Czech Republic:  Germany:   Poland:  
Slovakian 59.3  Polish 10.0  Lithuanian 10.8 
Polish 24.0  Romanian 8.4  Romanian 8.6 
Bulgarian 15.9  Italian 5.5  Bulgarian 5.5 
Romanian 14.9  Bulgarian 2.7  German 5.8 
German 9.1     Czech 4.9 
Austrian 3.1       
Demark:   Italy:   Slovakia:  
Polish 15.2  Romanian 21.1  Czech 69.1 
German   6.5  Bulgarian 12.5  Hungarian 26.7 
Romanian 5.6  Polish 9.3  Polish 18.9 
Lithuania 3.3  French 6.0  Romanian 9.6 
British 3.2  German 5.3  Austrian 8.2 
Swedish 2.9  Croatian 5.0  German 6.6 
   Spanish 2.1  Italian 5.5 
      Bulgarian 2.1 
 
 
The movement of people and offenders potentially suggests distinct spatial movement 
patterns, limited by the lack of comprehensive data from all EU member states. Romanian 
and Bulgarian offenders appear to spread predominantly from east to west, Polish offenders 
from east to west as well as north to south, and German offenders appeared to follow the 
distance decay effect (as the distance from home or other base increases, offending 
decreases [186]), as offending predominantly occurred in neighbouring countries, but also 
more widely across the EU. What is evident is the spatial distribution of these offenders 
across Europe, with more limited spatial movement from member states such as Latvia and 
Lithuania (only significant in Denmark, England and Poland). The northern European 
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countries, especially the UK continue to remain very popular for Latvian migrants. Despite 
the ability to work in other EU countries, McCollum et al. (2013) states that labour migrants 
continued to prefer the UK due to greater language barriers in other countries and the UK’s 
‘flexible’ labour market, making it easier to access employment there than elsewhere in 
Europe [144]. 
Overall this research has found very limited availability of data with which migration and 
crime can be explored, utilizing publicly available data. Although it was possible to obtain 
information and data relating to population and crime for each country at a number of 
geographic scales, and some were able to provide data on foreign and native 
offenders/population at scales lower than country level, very limited data was available 
beyond that. It has become apparent that the public availability of data relating to 
nationality (or country of origin) of offenders is extremely limited. It is unclear what the 
underlying reasons behind this are; although it is not thought unreasonable to consider that 
they may be politically driven in nature. This research also identified the highly significant 
data uncertainty when trying to paint a macro cross-member state picture of the intra-EU 
migration and crime issue, providing limited knowledge generation opportunities without 
multi-disciplinary cooperation on an international level [185]. 
Data from England was able to identify five nationalities across the three years warranting 
further interest – Polish, Latvia, Lithuanian, Portuguese and Romanian nationalities (and 
Italian in 2011 and Irish nationalities in 2012-2013). The identification of outlier nationalities 
using a number of statistical tests in England provided areas of further analysis which once 
explored fully could have the potential to impact police policy, crime prevention and 
intelligence strategies for local police forces. The presence and importance of these 
nationalities could not be repeated for any EU member state at the meso scale. Some data 
regarding nationalities was identified at the macro country level, but with limited detail and 
incomplete nationality breakdown. We anticipate that geographic and nationality disparity 
would be evident in other EU member states, however the data is currently not available to 
prove this. Should this data become available in the future, it could be used to inform EU 




Preliminary data analysis of data relating to types of crimes committed by foreign offenders 
predominantly mirrors that of the UK. In Austria, EU nationals are predominantly convicted 
of property offences which include: criminal damage, theft, burglary, embezzlement, 
robbery, unauthorised use of vehicle, blackmail, fraud and receiving stolen goods (see figure 
12).   





Violence against the person: murder, manslaughter, (aggravated) assault, GBH, injury affray  
Offences against freedom: stalking, threat, coercion, trespassing 
Property offences: criminal damage, theft, burglary, embezzlement, robbery, unauthorised use of vehicle, 
blackmail, fraud and receiving stolen goods 
Sexual offences: rape, abuse of minors, sexual coercion 
 
Figure 12: Types of crimes committed by Austrian, EU14, A8 and A2 nationals (as percentage of total 
crime) 
 
Similar results are apparent for crimes committed in Germany (see figure 13). Violent 











































































































































































































































































A2 + Croatian nationals 
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nationals commit two to three times as many offences of theft, compared with violent 
offences, and this continues to provide evidence that A8 and A2 nationals appear to commit 




Violent crimes: murder, euthanasia, manslaughter, abortion, robbery, crimes against personal freedom 
Sexual offences: sexual abuse, rape 
Theft: theft of MV, theft of motorcycle, shoplifting,  
Fraud: embezzlement, fraud, falsification of documents,  
Other offences: extortion, crimes against public order, receiving stolen property, money laundering, arson,  
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Overall, this research supports previous findings. Despite immigration being popularly 
associated with crime, EU migrants do not have a significant impact, being responsible for a 
small proportion of crime in the countries analysed [185]. This research sought to further 
explore spatial diversity of selected intra-EU migrants by nationality, adding to knowledge of 
spatial distribution of offenders across England. Statistics published on migration are usually 
“deprived of information on their spatial (regional) origin or destination” and researchers try 
to estimate patterns using other demographic data [187]. Data relating to foreign nationals 
and crime are even harder to obtain, especially if the initial movement is not recorded. This 
is because administrative databases have not been designed primarily for statistical 
purposes and academic research, and are consequently imperfect sources of information 
[187].  
Nationally held crime databases have the potential to be valuable in understanding and 
tackling transnational and migrant crime, however this is currently limited by the 
heterogeneity of recording systems [188]. Comparability of crime between different 
countries is hindered by variation in offence definitions and recording systems as discussed 
above. Attempts to compare crime data across Europe have tended to find higher rates of 
crime in Western Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe. The higher rates are likely to 
be the product of more accurate crime recording systems and reporting mechanisms in 
Western Europe and may not be a reflection of higher incidence of crime [189, 190].   
Considering the implementation of EU policies enabling the exchange of bio-information, 
activity seeking to provide a more generalised and contextual EU wide picture of intra-EU 
migrant crime than has previously been carried out is reported here. Data on localised 
offending by foreign nationals can be used to inform intelligence by national and 
international police agencies, to generate effective cross-border information exchange. 
However, where such information is not collected and available for analysis within member 
states, informed knowledge between member states is difficult to achieve. Data is needed 
upon which requirements for inter-state communication can be built upon for positive 
investigatory, community safety and crime prevention benefits.  
There is a clear need, in the modern technological, transnational society, for better data 
availability in this field. International policies “could be informed by a better understanding 
of the geography of immigration at the national, regional, and local levels, which is itself 
reliant on a better understanding of the data sets available and discrepancies between 
them” [191].  
Informed cross-border information exchange between member states is difficult to achieve 
if information is not collected and made available. We have shown the benefits of analysing 
data relating to localised offending by foreign nationals in England, and have highlighted 
some of the problems of utilising openly available data across EU member states [31, 150, 
184]. In order to inform intelligence by national and international police agencies, collective 
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understanding at the EU level is required, rather than simply continuing to focus on 
developing a national understanding for each EU member state individually in isolation. 
Good governance fundamentally demands good data and within the governance of the 
multi-Member State EU system good data must also be comparable across Member State 
boundaries in order to properly inform decisions, policies, planning, resources and priorities 
with cross-Member State impacts. An ability to evaluate, inform, develop and learn from the 
Prüm decision will be compromised without the ability to establish context through the use 
of common data sets at cross-Member State level, and within this research access to 
common spatial context of such data sets is equally important. Having developed an 
intuitive analytical model raising valuable questions for planning, priorities and 
improvements that model needs to progress to transferability. Such transferability will 
inform a common platform of Member State governance on the Prüm activity at hand, but 
is currently hampered by the inability to utilise suitably relevant, suitably detailed or 
suitably comparable data sets.    
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Appendix 1: MAD factor analysis  
Counts of prosecution charges received for all non-UK EU nationals were prepared and the 
absolute deviation of counts from the median value of the distribution established per 
nationality. The Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) provides a robust method to identify 
outliers within data sets, a method of measurement generally undertaken by establishing 
values that are 2 or 3 standard deviations (SD) from the mean as opposed to the median, so 
identifying particularly high or low values and an indication of data diversity. Establishing 
the MAD provides a method of greater robustness than use of the mean and SD values due 
to mean values (and consequentially SD) being susceptible to outliers apparent in this data, 
and far more apparent in the counts of charges at force level. Within such a highly skewed 
data set use of the median absolute deviation, as opposed to standard deviations from the 
mean which are reliant on the mean value, can be used to reliably identify counts that are 
extreme. Scale used of 2 or 3 (or more) as multipliers of the MAD to indicate extreme values 
are subjective and choice is reliant on the researcher [192]. Crime data tend towards 
routinely skewed distributions and an often encountered issue in Policing practice is 
identification of impact when considering resource provision, often through use of the mean 
and SD values. 
The concept of the MAD identifying outliers for removal can be reconsidered as providing a 
high integrity measure of the extremeness, or otherwise, of categories; in this case 
nationalities or Police force areas. Classification of ‘extreme’ therefore becomes the 
decision level that would otherwise be used to reject outliers from data. Here it was 
considered that values <2>  the MAD are suitable identifiers of extreme values [193], the 
purpose being to use the MAD as a robust and simply transferable method identifying 
categories of note for further or enhanced analysis as opposed to removal or disregard. The 
MAD is a measure of dispersion, or spread, around the median of the data set and the 
multiplier, termed the MAD factor in this analysis, offers the advantage of indicating the 
distance of the value from the decision criterion of >2. 
The MAD decision criteria was used to evidence selection of nationalities for analysis 
following which rates of prosecution charges by each responding force area were 
established as: 
1. Rate of charges against total force crime 
2. Rate of charges against force area total population 
3. Rate of charges against population of non-UK EU nationals per force area 
4. Rate of charges against population of the nationality under examination per force 
area 
Of these rates and the simple counts of charges per force area MAD factors for each were 
calculated, identifying at the same decision level those areas displaying extreme values 
within distributions.
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Appendix 2: Location Quotients 
Spatial analysis focuses on the Location Quotient (LQ), an indicator traditionally and widely 
employed in the field of economics since the 1940s as a measure of regional and planning 
economics relative to local economic activity. A relatively simple measure the LQ maintains 
geographic relevance, placing a chosen geographic area into context through comparison 
with the wider area [194]. Infrequently used in the measurement of crime it provides a 
useful alternative view, providing information on a particular region in relation to its wider 
region [195]. 
   
       
    
 
        
 
   
 
Cin = count of offending by subject nationality in a specific area (e.g. police force area) 
Ctn = count of population in specific area (e.g. police force area) 
Sum of Cin = count of offending by nationality in wider area (e.g. whole country) 
Sum of Ctn = count of population in wider area (e.g. whole country) 
 
Bryant and Miller (1997) employed the technique in its original sense of measuring 
employment concentrations but as a predictor of crime [196]. Brantingham and 
Brantingham (1198) fruitfully used LQ’s as an alternative and new method of identifying and 
understanding hot spots of crime [197]. Since initial introduction to the study of crime in the 
1990’s uptake as an analytical method for crime studies has been minimal [195, 198, 199]. 
Typically a density measurement tool it provides a measure of over or under representation 
relative to surrounding areas [199]. In this research we seek to identify spatial diversity and 
through the density measurement nature of LQs establish polygons displaying significantly 
high densities of intra-EU offending in comparison to two geographic scales; surrounding 
polygons and the wider spatial context of England. 
Miller et al. (1997) identify useful benchmarks for interpreting the LQ, however their work 
reflected on the use of the LQ to analyse economic development rather than density 
measurement of crime [194]. Within the general economic/development related disciplines 
use of the LQ attracts certain assumptions, which to a point are dependent on the topic of 
study and nature of data but pose issues for LQ interpretation and establishment of 
statistical significance. Mack and Jacobson (1996) identify assumptions not so readily 
accounted for in economic/development studies as demanding empirical evaluation [200]. 
McCord and Ratcliffe (2009), in a crime related study, note the lack of statistical significance 
testing methods for LQ’s available to them, however that study examined crime and spatial 
links with land use in a manner requiring LQ development and usage disparate to the study 
reported here [201]. 
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O’Donaghue and Gleave (2004) detail the use of a Standardised Location Quotient (SLQ) to 
overcome the otherwise arbitrarily defined cut off point of LQ values, proposing the LQ 
array should first be tested using a Kolmogorov- Smirnov test for normality [202]. If normally 
distributed z values of the LQ lying beyond 1.96 standard deviations are considered 
extreme, representing the 5% level of statistical significance for a two tailed test or 1.64 
standard deviations for a one tailed test. Heanue (2004) refines this, identifying the Shapiro-
Wilk (S-W) test as a preferred test of normality [203]. Following Heanue’s refinement we 
report the z values of the LQ to the 5%, two tailed level of significance, transforming the LQ 
into a SLQ. Where distributions were not found to be normal LQ values were logarithmically 
transformed and the S-W test repeated. If distributions cannot be determined as normal the 
SLQ cannot be used. 
The Location Quotient is readily calculated and visualisation via cartographic representation 
provides an intuitive image identifying areal units significant in value yet maintaining the 
dual scale context of neighbouring areal units and macro spatial context of the issue under 
examination. 
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Appendix 3: Lorenze Curve & Gini Coefficient. 
Comparison of the degree of concentration of offending between annual samples can be 
considered by calling on a second routine originating in economic orientated disciplines, 
namely the construction of a Lorenz Curve and the Gini coefficient for each sample. 
The Lorenz curve is a graphical representation used extensively within economics, ecology 
and public health as a method to describe inequality in a given factor. Originating within 
economics in 1905 its primary use is succinctly described by Moskowitz et al (2008): 
“In this context members of the population are ranked in terms of their wealth and 
the cumulative wealth is plotted (on the y-axis) against the cumulative proportion of 
the population (on the x-axis). One can then select any quantile to characterize 
concentration using a statistic such as ‘Y per cent of the wealth is owned by X per cent 
of the population’ [205].” 
If all individual factors are the same size the Lorenz curve is a straight 450 diagonal line 
labelled the line of equality. Inequality will result in the Lorenz curve falling below the line of 
equality. Here it is used to evaluate the degree of concentration of intra EU offending in 
each calendar year sample within English Police Force areas, being a function of the 
cumulative proportion of ordered offending by Police Force polygons mapped onto the 
corresponding cumulative proportion of offending. Figure 14 displays an explanatory Lorenz 
Curve graphic. Twenty percent of all offending intersects both the line of equality and the 
Lorenz curve. The x axis intersection of the 20% gridline at the line of equality equates to 
20% of all force polygons, representing equal division of offending between Police Force 
areas. Extending to the Lorenz Curve provides an intersect at 44% (n=16) of all Police Force 
polygons allowing the statement that 20% of all offending takes place within 44% of English 
Police Force polygons. Inversely translating to significant concentration as the remaining 20 
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Figure 14: Explanatory Lorenz curve graphic. 
 
Whilst usefully illustrating inequality a summary index of concentration, the Gini coefficient 
(G), is frequently presented in parallel. Gini coefficients summarise the total amount of 
inequality apparent in the sample, and range from a value of 0 (complete equality) to a 
theoretical value of 1 where, within an infinite population all is ‘owned’ by one factor. This 
coefficient is the ratio between the area enclosed by the line of equality and the Lorenz 
Curve and the total triangular area below the line of equality; the smaller the Gini 
coefficient the less concentrated the factor being assessed within the population under 
examination. 
  
           
  
   
   
 
Where n=number of ordered factors 
i=the size of an individual factor  
x’i =the ranked order 
 
Within the sphere of this research the Lorenz Curve and Gini coefficients provide 
measurements of inequality and concentration of intra EU offending within a spatial 
element of Police Force boundary polygons. Results provide potential corroboration of 
significant SLQ values and also allow comparison between calendar years as both annual 
samples have comparative spatial elements. Mining Lorenz Curve data provides the spatial 
elements (Police Forces) constituting quartiles in ranked order. In this case 8 Police forces 
are associated within the top quartile, ranked order signifying their individual position and 
context within such grouping. Comparison of Gini coefficients over time informs on the 
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dispersion (or otherwise) of offending by nationality at the macro scale. Examination of 
ranked position of a Police Force areal unit within data set quartiles between time periods, 
in parallel with knowledge of the SLQ position of a the areal unit may inform future risk of 
increased offending, indications of positive reduction initiatives and movement within the 
spatial patterns of offending.  
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Appendix 4: Administrative divisions of EU28 member states 
Country 
Administrative Divisions 
NUTS1 NUTS2 NUTS3 
Austria (AT) 3 Gruppen von Bundesländern 9 Bundesländer 80 Gruppen von Politishen Bezirken 
Belgium (BE) 3 regions 11 provinces 44 arrondissments 
Bulgaria (BG) 2 Rajoni 6 Rajoni za planirane 28 Oblasti 
Cyprus (CY)       
Croatia (HR)   3 Regija 20 županije + capital city 
Czech Republic (CZ) 1 Území 8 Oblasti 14 Kraje 
Denmark (DK)   5 Regioner 11 Landsdeler 
Estonia (EE)   5 Groups of Maakond 15 Maakond 
Finland (FI) 2 Manner-Suomi, Ahvenananmaa/Fasta Finland, Åland 5 Suuralueet/Storområden 20 Maakunnat/ Landskap 
France (FR) 9 Z.E.A.T + 1 DOM 27 Régions 101 Départements 
Germany (DE) 16 Bundesländer 38 Regionsbezirke 412 Land/Stadt-kreise  
Greece (EL) 4 Groups of development regions 13 Periféries 51 Nomoi 
Hungary (HU) 3 Statisztikai nagyrégiók 7 Tervezési-statisztikai régiók 19 Magyék + Budapest 
Ireland (IE)   2 Regions 8 Regional Authorities 
Italy (IT) 5 Gruppi di regioni 21 Regioni 110 Provincie 
Latvia (LV)     5 Statistiskie reģioni 
Lithuania (LT)     10 Apskritys 
Luxembourg (LU)       
Netherlands (NL) 4 Landsdelen 12 Provincies 40 COROP Regio's 
Malta (MT)   2 Gzejjer 6 Distretti 
Poland (PL) 6 Regiony 16 Województwa 66 Podregiony 
Portugal (PT) 3 Continente + Regioes autonomas 
7 Comissaoes de Coordenacao regional + Regioes 
autonomas 
30 Grupos de Concelhos 
Romania (RO) 4 Macroregiuni 8 Regiuni 41 Judete + 1 city 
Slovenia (SI)   2 Kohezijske regije 12 Statistične regije 
Slovakia (SK)   4 Oblasti 8 Kraje 
Spain (ES) 7 Agrupación de comunidades autónomas 17 Comunidades y ciudades autónomas + 2 cities 50 Provincias 
Sweden (SE) 3 Grupper av riksområden 8 Riksområden 21 Län 
UK 12 Regions 37 counties  139 Districts 
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Appendix 5: Overview of data availability, including the socio-demographic factors 
pertinent to the analysis and the geographic level they are available for each of the EU28 
members states. 
a) EU15 Countries 
Factor \  Country AT BE DE DK FI FR IT NL PT ES SE 
Population 
Country (NUTS1) X X X X X X X X X X X 
Region (NUTS2) X X X X X X X X X X X 
County (NUTS3) X X X X X X X X X  X 
Foreign 
Population 
Country (NUTS1) X X X X X X X X X X X 
Region (NUTS2) X X X X X X X X X X X 
County (NUTS3)  X X X X X X X X  X 
Crime 
Country (NUTS1) X X X X X X X X X X X 
Region (NUTS2) X X X X X X X X X X X 




Country (NUTS1) X  X X X X X X  X  
Region (NUTS2) X  X X X X X   X  
County (NUTS3)   X X X X      
Crime by 
nationality 
Country (NUTS1) X  X X    X X    
Region (NUTS2) X  X         
County (NUTS3)            
* No data was available for Greece and Ireland 
* Luxembourg is not included in the table due to single geographic division due to size of country. 
* The UK is also not included in this table, as the data was sources separately.   
 
b) A10 Countries 
Factor \  Country CZ EE HU LV LT PO SI SK 
Population 
Country (NUTS1) X X X X X X X X 
Region (NUTS2) X X X X X X X X 
County (NUTS3) X X   X  X  
Foreign 
Population 
Country (NUTS1) X X X X   X  
Region (NUTS2) X X X X   X  
County (NUTS3) X      X  
Crime 
Country (NUTS1) X X X X X X X X 
Region (NUTS2) X X X X X X X X 




Country (NUTS1)         
Region (NUTS2)         
County (NUTS3)         
Crime by 
nationality 
Country (NUTS1) X     X  X 
Region (NUTS2)         
County (NUTS3)         
* No data was available for Malta and Cyprus (no geographic divisions) 
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c) A2 and Croatia 
Factor \  Country RO BG HR 
Population 
Country (NUTS1) X X X 
Region (NUTS2) X X X 
County (NUTS3) X X X 
Foreign 
Population 
Country (NUTS1) X X X 
Region (NUTS2) X X X 
County (NUTS3) X X X 
Crime 
Country (NUTS1) X X  
Region (NUTS2) X X  




Country (NUTS1)    
Region (NUTS2)    
County (NUTS3)    
Crime by 
nationality 
Country (NUTS1)    
Region (NUTS2)    
County (NUTS3)    
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